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PREFACE
This document constitutes one volume of the fi:ial report prepared under
Contract NAS9-90+6, Space Station Safety Study, which was conducted by the
Aerospace Systems Division, Aerospace Group, The Boeing Company, under the
direction of the Advanced Projects Office, Advanced Missions Program
Office, Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA. The objective of the study was to
develop a management tool for evaluating concer)tual designs of future
mam-fed space systems from a safety viewpoint. This objective was achieved
through the application of methodical techniques, which are described
where necessary in appropriate volumes of this final report, for analyzing
space station safety problems. This work resulted in the development of
Crew Safety Guidelines which can be used in evaluating future space
station concepts.
In Phase I of the study, the work was directed toward a broad class of
space stations, using several specific configurations as examples, and
considering both crew safety and mission accomplishmFnt as safety goals.
In May 1969, the study was redirected by NASA into Phase II to provide
more direct support to the NASA Phase B Future Space Station Study,
considering only crew safety as the safety goal. To the extent possible,
the work done in Phase I was revised and adapted to Phase II and all
documents of this final report, except as otherwise noted, include the
results from both phases. In both phases the study scope included only
on-orbit operations and not launch, boost, de-orbit, and recovery opera-
tions, or any operations of the logistics support system, except for
close-in rendezvous and docking operations.
The approach taken in the study was to examine the space station from the
viewpoint of :safety only, with the intent of identifying as complete a
list as possible of those measures which should be taken to maximize crew
safety. Also, and especially in Phase II, the study dealt primarily with
station concepts, rather than specific designs or hardware items. It was
not possible, and no attempt was made, to examine the impact of safety
measures on other important aspects of space station development, such as
cost, design difficulty, or operational suitability. As station develop-
ment proceeds, trade studies between safety measures and other factors will
be required and management decisions must be made as to the extent to which
other desirable features will be permitted to override safety measures.
The documents constituting tr- final study report are:
• D2-113070-4. Condensed Summary Report
• DL-113070 -9. Crew Safety Guidelines, Volumes I and II
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• D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses
• Analysis of Operations
• Experiment Program
• Traffic Patterns Analysis
• Human Requirements
• Meteoroid Penetration
• D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram
e D2-113070-10, Fault Tree Analysis
• D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis
Other documents produced during the study but not part of the final
report are:
• D2-113070-J., Detail Study Plan (Phase I only)
• D2-113070-2, Midterm Oral Report
• D2-113070-3, Final Oral Report
• D2-113070-7, baseline Mission Description (Phase I cnl;-)
• D2-113070-8, Baseline System D,.:scription (Phase i oni.1)
This document, D2-113070-5, "Crew Safety Guidelines", io published in
two volumes. Volume I. consisting of pages 1 through 1e6, contains the
Introduction, the Crew Safety Guidelines Description, and Crew Sa;'^ty
Guidelines covering Hazard Groups 1.0 through 8.0. Voli:me II, _,cu.si.;t:ing
of pages 187 through 396, contains Crew Safety Guid, ii..e. covering hazard
Groups 9.0 through 12.0, the Cross Indexes, and the References. Sce the
Table of Contents, page vii, for a further breakdowTr, of Hazard group and
specific page numbers.
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ABSTRACT
This document contains the space station Crew Safety Guidelines developed
under Contract NAS9 -9046. The basic arrangement of the guidelines is by
hazard groups, with each guideline appearing only once. Cross-indexes are
provided which relate each guideline to other hazard groups if appropriate,
to subsystems affected by the hazard, to key words, and to damage contain-
ment and control procedures.
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O	 3.0 CREW SAFETY GUIDELINES
This section contains the complete set of guidelines, arranged alphabetically
by hazard groups. The guidelines are filed as follows:
In Volume I
-- Nos. 1.1 through 1.32
-- Nos. 2.1 through 2.4
-- Nos. 3.1 through 3.25
-- Nos. 4.1 through 4.14
-- Nos. 5.1 through 5.12
-- Nos. 6.1 through 6.13
-- Nos. 7.1 through 7.23
-- Nos. 8.1 through 8.33
.
.
O
3.9 Radiation	 -- Nos. 9.1 through 9.21
3.10 Temperature Extremes	 -- Nos. 10.1 through 10.30
3.11 Spacecraft Accelerations	 -- Nos. 11.1 through 11.12
3.12 General	 -- Nos. 12.1 through 12.63
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO •	 9.1
TITLE:
	 Controlled Access and Use of Radiation Sources
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations, Experiments
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Unauthorized personnel should be restricted from using radiation-producing
equipment or handling and using on-board radioisotopes. Consider the installa-
tion of appropriate caution signs and/or other means of warning, featuring
visible or audible signals.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-11.3070-10, FT -3 (Radiation), 3-H, "Misapplication or misuse of on-board
radiation source."
REMARKS:
The probability of misapplication or misuse of on-board radiation sources
would be at a minimum if control of the accessibility and use is restricted to
only qualified personnel.
C)
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO.	 9.2
TITLE:
	 Disposal of Radioactive Material
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Orerations, Electrical Power (EP)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Safe procedures should be established for the disposal of radioactive waste or
radiation-contaminated material. These procedures should also include the
actions necessary for the disposal of a spent or failed nuclear power reactor.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 1-I, "Crew members are exposed to a
radiation source."
REMARKS:
Safe methods of radioactive waste disposal should be consistent with standard
laboratory practices. For low-level waste, consider returning it to Earth for
disposal or destruction within the Earth's atmosphere. Special consideration
should be given to the disposal of higher-level radiation waste where return. to
Earth or containirnaticn of Earth's atmosphere may be hazardous.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
O
0
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO.
	 9.3
TITLE: Handling and Use of Radioactive Material
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations, Structures/Mechanical Systems,
Experiments, Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
On-board handling and use. of radioactive material cr radiation-producing
equipment should ccnfcrm or be consistent with established NASA and Atomic
Energy Commission policy and procedures for radiation protection standards.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation),3-H, "Misapplication or misuse of on-board
radiation source."
2. SP4-41-S, Radiological Safety Handbook, NASA Safety Office.
REMARKS:
Latest available established procedures in the handling and use of radioactive
material should be made readily available to all parties involved in spacecraft
planning and design where such materials are a factor. Final decisions and
the mead of implementing them should be subject to the approval of a control
board.
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO • 9. 4
TITLE: Microwave and X-Radiation Hazard
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Should radar and/or communications equipment exist on-board or within the
vicinity of the spacecraft with effective radiated power sufficient to present
a hazard from exposure to the produced RF or X-radiation, then positive protec-
tive measures should be taken to prevent accidental personnel exposure.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 1-C, "Crew members will be injured by non-
ionizing radiation."
REMARKS:
Personnel protection measures may be utilized through the proper application of
controlled access areas, equipment interlocks, and warning systems. Areas of
particular attention should be the fields of radiation produced by any energized
antenna, waveguide, feed-horn structure, transmission lines, or high-voltage
electronic equipment.
f^
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO. 9.5
TITLE: Nuclear Power Radiation Protection
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power (EP), Structures/
Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Nuclear powered electrical power sources should be located and shielded to
protect crew members from accumulating excessive radiation dosage.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of power source
radiation.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 1-M, "Crew members lack radiation protection
due to inadequate radiation shielding"; 3-K, "Nuclear power reactor provides
a radiation source"; and 5-H, "Shielding is not adequate, by design, to
protect against the expected environment.
3. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 3, "Analysis of Operations."
4. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 578., 57D, 57E and 57F•
'orded the crew from the space radiation environment by the
nd equipment arrangements will probably not be adequate for
^e nuclear power source radiation. Furthermore, there are
1 to the space base, e . g., EVA, logistin s support, free-
;, etc., that must also be protected. Location and shielding
,er source must take these factors into account. Consideration
Le type of mxcleer power to be used should be given to the
,es of radiation produced and the difficulty of providing
n.
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO •	 9.6
TITLE: Nuclear Power Unit Radiation Protection
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS, Operations, Electrical Power System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Crew location during the Nuclear Power Unit activation should be restricted
to refuge areas affording high protective shielding, until radiation levels
have been checked in all habitable areas within the spacecraft and have been
found to be within acceptable limits.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Paragraph 3.2.8, "Nuclear Power Unit."
2. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 3-K, "Nuclear power reactor provides a
radiation source."
REMARKS:
No data exists on the use of a nuclear power unit in manned space operations.
This guideline is suggested as a precautionary measure until sufficient data
or experience has been accumulated, with hardware designed to afford radiation
shielding for space cretins from a nuclear power unit, to achieve a high level
of confidence in crew protection during normal activities.
O
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO.	 9.7
TITLE: Nuclear Reactor Safety
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Po
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Spacecraft power or propulsion systems employing t
should provide fail-safe measures for emergency sb
provide alternate methods of reactor heat dissipat
the primary cooling system.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070•=10, FT-3 (Radiation), 3-K, "Nuclear
tion source."
2. D2-113070-11., Subsystems Analysis (EP), for pc
toxicity.
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8E, ;
REMARKS:
^
yul failure resulting in the reactor's critical ma
d be hazardous to personnel due to the increas
Also applies to the following hazard group: 10. 7
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation 	 NO,	 9,8
TITLE:
	 Orbital Path Radiation Environment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The spacecraft radiation protection provisions should be consistent with the
orbital flight path type, orbital height, and inclination selected.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 3-E, "An artificial radiation source
external to the spacecraft is-present."
REMARKS:
The near-Earth radiation environment is a function of the orbital inclination,
height, and type of orbit (e.g., synchronous versus circular or elliptical
orbit). Thus ., the radiation shielding and protection provisions should be in
accord with the selected orbital flight path.
t -^
0
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO-	 9.9
TITLE: placement of Equipment and Stores
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Spacecraft design and layout should make maximum use of any on-board mass as
radiation shielding.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 1-M, "Crew members lack radiation protection
due to inadequate radiation shielding."
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of radiation.
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 32E and 51B.
REMARKS:
Additional radiation shielding might be accomplished through strategic placement
of spacecraft equipment, stores, tanks, etc., between the radiation source and
the habitable volume.
- 197 -
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HAZARD GROUP : Radiation
	 NO.	 9.10
TITLE: protection Against Nuclear Explosion Radiation
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Protection of the space station crew against the effects of a nuclear device
explosion in space that releases radiation into the space station's orbital
path should be considered.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Anal sis (CS), for potential hazard of radiation.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation, 3-J 2 "A nuclear induced artificial orbital
radiation environment is present."
3. D2-113070-9 ) Logic Diagram, Propositions 8E and 32E.
REMARKS:
There is a possibility that during a long-duration Earth orbital space mission
a nuclear device may be exploded in space at an altitude which will release
radiation into the orbital path of the space station. If the explosion takes
place near enough to the space station it may not be possible to provide
sufficient shielding for protection. Then consideration could be given to
changing the orbit altitude. As a last resort, the space station would have
to be abandoned and the crew returned to Earth. Procedures should be established
to cover the various possible contingencies and the actions to be taken.
O
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO- 9.11
TITLE:
	 Radiation Detectors Location and Characteristics
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Coamunications and Data Management System,
Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The location and characteristics of the radiation detectors should•be consistent
with the expected radiation environment.
REFERENCES:
I. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 4-0, "Radiation type present is incompatible
with the warning system employed"; and 4-P, "The radiation level warning
system is isolated from the radiation source."
REMARKS:
Due to anisotropy and the variation in energy, intensity, and types of radiation
particles in the projected orbits for a spacecraft, considerable effort may be
required to define the optimum detector characteristics and location for the
radiation monitoring and warning system.
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO • 9.12
TITLE: Radiation Effects upon Spacecraft Materials
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Radiation effects upon spacecraft electronic'materials, microelectronic circuit
elements, electrical systems, metals, ceramics, polymers, and other organic
and inorganic materials should be thoroughly investigated for radiation-induced
transient and permanent effects in terms of false signals, degradation,
catastrophic failures, and contamination.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, propositions 9B and 32E.
REMARKS:
An analysis of spacecraft material response to the mission radiation environment
should be required to insure safe and reliable system operation.
0
0
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO. 9.13
TITLE: Radiation Environment Restrictions on-EVA
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
In low-inclination (up to 600), low-altitude orbits, Extra-Vehicular Activity
should not be scheduled while the spacecraft is passing through the South
Atlantic Anomaly. For polar orbit, the same guideline applies; but, in addition,
the occurrence of a solar event should require that EVA be avoided for that
portion of the orbit which is not protected by the magnetic field.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 5-F, "Exposure due to lack of shielding
occurs during suited EVA operations.".
REMARKS:
Maximum expected radiation , exposure'of ahy'personnel exposed outside the
spacecraft would occur during passage through the above areas.
6
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO- 9.14
TITLE: Radiation Exposure and Control Program
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSs Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A mission radiation control program should be instituted to develop radiation
exposure limits, procedures, design criteria, and responsibilities consistent
with the expected mission environment and period of orbital stay.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 1-B, "Crew members mill be injured by
ionizing radiation."
REMARKS:
Radiation exposure and control is currently handled in accordance with NASA
standards for radiation exposure. Yet a thorough investigation should be
conducted to ensure that these standards are applicable to the Earth space
system environment and the projected period of orbital stay.
c)
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO- 9.15
TITLE: Radiation Exposure Record
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSs Crew System (CS), Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A cumulative radiation exposure record should be kept on each crew member ) and
personnel who have reached the limit of safe radiation exposure should be
returned to Earth without delay.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 1-B, "Crew members will be injured by ioniz-
ing radiation"; and.4-G, "Accvnu ated.radiation exposure not recogaized."
2. D2-113070-U,.Subsystems r ysis (CS), for potential hazard of radiation.
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 32E.
REMARKS:
A cumulative radiation exposure record should be mai, twined for each crew
member and reviewed at periodic intervals in order to prevent overexposure to
radiation and the potential ill effects of such overexposure.
-203=
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO- 9.16
TITLE: Radiation Haven
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSs Structures/Mechanical Systems, Crew
System (CS), Electrical Power System (EP)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Provision should be made in the spacecraft for a designated shelter that would
serve as a haven for radiation protection against possible high-intensity radia-
tion events. This shelter should contain the necessary life support equipment
and provisions consistent with the maximum expected stay time for the particular
mission profile.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 2-H, "Flare-produced high energy solar
particles are present."
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS and EP), for potential hazards of
solar and power source radiation.
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8E, 30C, 30D, 30E, 40C and 42D.
REMARKS:
During  an extended orbital space mission, at least one high-intensity solar
flare event may be expected to occur. Thus, if the spacecraft structure and
equipment do not inherently provide the protection required, a special maven of
maximum protection may be required. The haven should be self-sufficient so the
crew can operate the necessary station functions and also take care of their own
necessities for the maximum expected shelter time. The haven design should also
take into account the possibility of crew protection against excessive radiation
from a malfunctioning nuclear power source or failure of its shielding.
0
O
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO. 9,17
TITLE: Radiation Monitoring
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Radiation monitoring, including cumulative radiation level records; should be
maintained to ensure the precise determination and provide clear notification
of radiation conditions and warning of possible over-irradiation of the
spacecraft. The detection system should continuously monitor the interior
and exterior radiation levels and record the accumulated dosage for the
mission.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 4-D, "Deficient personnel radiation exposure
monitoring provisions (dosimetry)."
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of radiation.
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 10F, 18D and 40B.
REMARKS:
As a suggested minimum, at least two types of radiation detection instrumenta-
tion should be used. One system would monitor continuously the radiation
intensity or dose rates, and the other would measure the cumulative dose for
the mission. The monitoring system should be redundant to ensure continuous
operation. Also, continuous radiation monitoring should be conducted by Earth-
based stations as added assurance of early detection of radiation.
c^
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO • 9.18
TITLE: Radiation Protection during EVA
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical Systems, Electrical
Power System (EP)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Additional protection for crew members performing EVA in the proximity of a
nuclear power source should be provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of power source
radiation.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 5-C, "Crew members lack radiation shielding
while exterior to the spacecraft."
3. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Proposition 58D.
REMARKS:
Total shielding coverage of a nuclear power source may not be possible because
of cooling requirements of the power source. This means there will be areas
surrounding the power source that are not adequately shielded to protect EPA
crew members. Therefore, consideration should be given to providing some
additional temporary shielding to protect persons working near a nuclear power
source.
l)
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO •	 9.19
TITLE:	 Radioactive Stores
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Environmental Control/Life
Support System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Areas where radioactive materials are used or stored should be monitored for
radioactive contamination, and suitable warnings provided if radioactivity
exceeds established limits.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10 2 FT-3 (Radiation), 7-D, "Internal exposure results from
inhalation of radiation particles."
rnMAS:
pplies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
el
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO. 9,20
TITLE:
	 Spacecraft Radiation Shielding
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical Systems
SAFETY GUIDELINE;
Spacecraft provisions for radiation shielding should provide the effective
shield thickness required to protect against exceeding an established mission
radiation dose limit.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, Fr-3 (Radiation), 1-M, "Crew members lack radiation protection
due to inadequate radiation shielding."
R7Ars
a
S:
esign goal, the interior of the spacecraft should be sufficiently shielded
t the radiation environment experienced by the crew within the spacecraft
would be similar to the terrestrial radiation environment. This could be
accomplished by either specific shielding material, equipment arrangement, or
a combination of both.
O
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HAZARD GROUP: Radiation	 NO- 9.21
TITLE:
	 Selection of Materials for Use in Radiation Environment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
EMMN
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Precautions should be taken in the selection of spacecraft materials to ensure
that the materials will not support induced radiation.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-3 (Radiation), 5-K, "Shielding becomes inadequate due to
effect of induced radiation";.and 5-P, "Shielding material of a type that
sustains radioactivity is used in the spacecraft."
REMARKS:
Certain metallic materials when exposed to radiation for a period of time will
support radioactive production. The intent of this guideline is to ensure
radiation compatibility with materials selected for the long-&zration space
mission.
L!
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HAZAID GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO • 10.1
CO2 Control Equipment Maintenance
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNC11ONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Maintenance procedures for CO 2 control equipment should take into account the
possible high operating temperatures of the equipment and the possibility of
release of contaminants during maintenance.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of excessive
CO2.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 10G 3 32B, 48F and 61E.
REMARKS:
Many CO2 control concepts involve operating temperatures of 500-1800 OF and
the production of carbon, both of which have an adverse affect on maintenance.
Consideration must be given in the design of this equipment to the problems of
access, working on hot equipment or providing insulation, requirements for
long cool-off periods, use of high temperature seals, carbon removal without
contaminating the cabin atmosphere, evacuation of gases and purging of equipment
to preclude cabin air contacting hot gases or carbon.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO• 10.2
TITLE: Combustible Waste Materials
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The storage and disposal of combustible waste materials should be such that a
fire hazard or traffic obstruction is not created.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 6-G, "Combustible materials are
present," 9-E, "Impeded access prevents effective control of fire," and 19-F,
"Physical object within compartment obstructs escape route."
REMARKS:
Storage and disposal of all waste materials can be expected to be a problem.
Combustible waste, because of the fire hazard, is particularly critical.
Consideration should be given to returning this material to Earth at frequent
intervals.
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO. 10.3
TITLE:
	 Containment of Fire
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System,
Structures/Mechanical Systems
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Flame arresters should be provided in all ducting through which flame could
propagate.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10 2 FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 19-E, "Compartment escape route
is obstructed due to fire."
REMARKS:
Fire could spread from one compartment to another through the ECS or other
ducting.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 No. 10.4
TITLE:
	 Cryogenics
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Cryogenic piping systems should provide for both automatic and manual emergency
shut-off.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 4-D, "Injury results from contact
with cryogenic fluid."
REMARKS:
A leak or rupture in a cryogenic system cold expose crew members to the
cryogen. A mesas should be provided to stop the flo g of the cryogen to the
site of the leak. If the cryogen is essential to crew safety, a redundant
system may be necessary.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
7. Illness and Injury
c>
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO. 10.5
TITLE: Electrical Power Source Cooling
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power (EP)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Adequate cooling capability should be provided to prevent overheating of
electrical power sources even during worst-case conditions.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of fire,
smoke, toxicity.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 3-D, "Injury results from
exposure to heat generated by chemical reaction"; and 15-G, "Operational
breakdown results from high temperature exceeding functional capability of
subsystem."
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8D and 16D.
REMARKS:
Some electrical power sources (e.g., battery, nuclear, radioisotope) require
cooling systems to maintain correct operating temperatures for best efficiency.
Overtemperatures can result in potentially hazardous situations; therefore,
adequate cooling should be provided to handle the maximum expected operating
temperatures. Redundancy of the cooling system should also be provided so
continuous cooling will be available even though a failure in the primary
cooling system occurs.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 4. Electrical
6. Explosion
23.5 -
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Tegmrature Extremes	 NO - 10.6
TITLE: Electrical Power System Location
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Paver (EP)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Power generating and distribution equipment which is a potential scrarce of fire
should ?,: located in unpressurized areas of the space station.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of fire,
smoke, toxicity.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 1-B, "Crew members are injured
through exposure to potentially fatal heat."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 16D and 32D.
REMARKS:
Since most electrical power system power generating and distribution equipment
could be a source of fire in an oxygen atmosphere, it is advantageous to
locate th!.s equipment in uninhabited and unpressurized areas of the station.
Therefore, only that equipment which cannot, practically, be located elsewhere
should be in inhabited areas, and then only if adequate shielding is provided.
This will involve trade studies to determine the degree to which this concept
is feasible,as consideration must be given to the reliability of the equipment
and the need for redundancy when EVA would be required for maintenance.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 4. Electrical
6. Explosion
O
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes 	 NO • 10.7
TITLE: Fire Control
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Fire control equipment and/or methods should be provided which can be auto-
matically initiated, or are readily accessible and can be manually controlled.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of fire,
smoke, toxicity.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-2 ( Temperature Extremes), 7-B, "In jury results from failure
to control fire," and 9-B, "Emergency fire control action is not facilitated
by the fire emergency warning system."
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8D, 15K, 18E and 47E.
REMARKS:
There are many different types of fires that may occur in a space station.
Assuming there are no self-propagating materials on-board the space station,
the most effective method for extinguishing a fire might be decompression of
the affected compartment. An intermediate method might provide for automatic
and/or manual shut -down of ventilating equipment and oxygen supply to the
affected compartment when a fire is detected. Another possibility is partial
depressurization with crew using 02 masks and then repressurizing with an
inert gas to terminat^ or retard fire propagation. For cases where these
methods are not warranted, fire extinguishing equipment should be provided
that c:an cope with any possible fire, smoke, or toxicity problem. Evaluation
of the potential condition should determine if an automatically controlled
respcnse is required or if manual operation of the equipment would be sufficient.
Adequate training and procedures should be supplied the crew to ensure that
the correct remedial action is taken for a particular fire. Rapid access
should be provided to potential. fire areas for fire extinguishing equipment,
e.g., areas behind display panels frequently present accessibility problems.
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes
	
NO - 10.8
TITLE: Fire-Resistant Electrical Insulation
APPLICABLE SUBSYSYEMS/FUNCTIONIS: Comm. and Data Mgmt., Electrical Power,
Environmental Control/Life Support, Experiments, Stability and Control
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Electrical insulation should be, as a minimum, self-extinguishing iri the
spacecraft atmosphere.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 19-E, "Compartment escape route is
obstructed due to fire."
REMARKS:
Fire could spread through electrical cable conduit. High concentrations of
oxygen may require a stringent limitation on the types of insulation material
which would be permitted.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
4. Electrical
O
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO. 10.9
TITLE: Fire Retardant Electrical Equipment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Power equipment racks and cables should be as resistant to fire as possible.
Emergency equipment and casualty mode operations should be developed.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 15-K, "Fire results in failure of
electric power system."
REMARKS:
A weight penalty must attend any redundancy in equipment. A casualty mode
operation study might show that portions of the primary equipment could be
utilized for a reduced capability during emergency conditions.
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HAZARD GROUP: 
Temperature Extremes
	
NO - 10.10
TITLE: Freezing of Fluid Lines
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
All fluid lines should be adequately protected from freezing due to proximity
to cryogenics, or exposure to space.
REFERENCES:
1. Space Flight-Hazards Catalog, MSC 00134, September, 1969, Hazard No. 7.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 4-D, "Injury results from direct
contact with cryogenic fluid."
REMARKS:
Restricted flow of some fluids could cause equipment damage or equipment
operation impairment. In addition, total freezing could possibly cause the line
to rupture, thereby creating another hazard from fluid loss and the contamination
effect of the spilled fluid.
O
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes 	 NO 10.11
TITLE: Heating Element Flame Suppression
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power, Environmental Control/
Life Support, Experiments
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
H:;ating elements which must be exposed to the atmosphere should be-provided
with a device to prevent the propagation of flame.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 5-B, "Electrical system component
C
	 heated through normal system operations."
REMARKS:
Electrical devices (lights, heating elements, etc.) which generate heat could
be a source of ignition.
Also applicable to the following hazard group: 6. Explosion
^l
- 221 -
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP:
	 Temperature Extremes	 NO 10.12
TITLE:	 Heat Monitoring in Operating Equipment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS:	 Electrical Power, Experiments, Structures/
Mechanical, Environ. Control/Life Support, Stability and Control
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Components-which could generate excessive heat due to friction should be auto-
matically monitored for temperature increase 	 and	 sealed from the atmosphere.
An overheat warning signal should be provided.
REFERENCES:
1.	 D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 2-C, "Injury results from exposure
to heat generated by mechanical source."
REMARKS:
Heat due to friction could provide injury to personnel or could provide a
source of ignition.
c^
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO. 10.13
TITLE: Hypergolic and Pyrophoric Material
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSt Stability and Control, Operatic.ns, Experi-
ments
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The amounts of hypergolic, pyrophoric, or other easily ignitable materials on-
board the spacecraft should be restricted to the minimum necessary and close
control should be exercised over their handling and use.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 6-D, "Fire occurs of a hypergolic
or pyrophoric nature."
REMARKS:
Positive control over these materials is required because they are a serious
fire hazard. The controls should include restrictions on the areas in which the
materials are used and permit only authorized personnel to work with or handle
them.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
6. Explosion
C'
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO. 10.14
TITLE: Ignition Source Control
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations, Electrical Power (EP)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Potential ignition sources, such as lighted cigarettes or open flames, etc.,
should not be permitted within pressurized inhabited compartments of the space
station unless rigid control can be exercised to insure that a fire hazard is
not present.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of fire, smoke,
toxicity.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 3-J, "Injury results from fire
occurring within a normally manncd area of spacecraft."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 16D.
REMARKS:
Smoking and use of open flames for heating are a definite hazard when used in
an oxygen rich atmosphere. Ideally, no smoking or open flames should be
allowed on-board the space station. However, because of the numerous activities
and experiments that will occur during a long-duration mission, rigid adherence
to this rule may not be practical. Therefore, if smoking or open flames are
allowed, it should only be when protection is afforded by a device which will
prevent propagation of flame to the ambient atmosphere.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
6. Explosion
c>
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes
	 [NO. 10.15
TITLE: Isolation of Oxygen Source
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical Systems (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
If absence of oxygen is utilized as a means of preventing fires, design slould
provide that no single failure could produce an oxygen atmosphere.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 06-H, "Sufficient oxygen is present
to support combustion."
REMARKS:
An inert atmosphere or unpressurized area may be used for storage of flammable
materials. In such cases, measures should be taken to ensure absence of oxygen
in the area. For example, cryogenic oxygen should net be piped through such
an area nor should entry to the area praride oxygen.
c
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO. 10.16
TITLE:	 Location of Combustibles
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations, Structures/Mechanical Systems
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Passageways should be kept free of all combustible materials and oxidizers.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 19 -I, "Fire occurs within the
escape rciate."
REMA RKS:
Fire coiild spread tc other comq)artmen,,s through passageways, or crew movement.
iL an emergency could be impeded, by burning material in a passageway.
U
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HAZARD GROUP; Temperature Extremes	 NO • 10.17
TITLE:	 Lubricants
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Lubricants used in mechanical components which are essential for survival should
be capable of withstanding extreme temperatures.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 2-J, "Subsystem failure results
from the effects of low temperature," and 15-D, "Subsystem failure results
from the effects of high temperature."
REMARKS:
Failure of a lubricant could in turn result in failure of the component.
Loss of the component function could impact on safety or injury could be caused
directly bj the component failure.
C
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes 	 NO - 10.18
TITLE: Manual Control of Temperature Control Systems
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A capability for manually controlling operation of the equipment used for
cabin and equipment temperature control should be considered.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/ISS), for potential hazard of loss
of thermal control.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 46D.
REMARKS: 
Situations may arise where normal (automatic) control of the thermal control
equipment is inoperative and it would be advantageous to have the capability
to manually control the equipment until normal control can be re-established.
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GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO- 10.19
over-current Protection
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power (EP), Comm. and Data Mgtnt.,
Environmental Control/Life Support, Experiments, Stability and Control
SAFETY GUWELINE:
Current limiting devices or techniques should be used to preclude hazardous
over-currents. They should be readily accessible, provide visible indication
of their state, and be resistant to inadvertent or accidental activation, fire,
explosion, shock,and explosive decompression. They should provide protection
both to the current source and to the "using" equipment.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 5-D, "Electrical system component
heated through electrical system fault."
2. D2-11307C-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP),.for potential hazard of fire, smoke,
toxicity.
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 8D.
REMARKS:
Over-current in an element of the electrical subsystem could produce sufficient
heat to directly injure a crew member, provide an ignition source for a fire
or explosion, cause damage to electrical equipment, or release contaminants
that could endanger crew safety.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
4. Electrical
6. Explosion
^c
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO. 10.20
TITLE:
	 personnel Protection from Heated Surfaces
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Design provisions should be made which assure that no heated surfaces would
provide a source of injury to crew members or provide a source of ignition.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT
-2 (Temperature Extremes), 1-G, "Injury results from direct
ext,osure to high temperature element," and 6-I, "Ignition source is provided.'
REMARKS:
Heated surfaces should be kept to a minimum; but, where required or unavoidable,
they should be protected by insulation, 'gua: •'.3,
 or the like.
(_1
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes 	 NO • 10.21
TITLE: propellant Supply System Location
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Propellant supply system equipment and plumbing which uses tox4.c or potentially
flammable fluids shoo' ,^ be located in uninhabited areas.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of propellant
leakage.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 6-D, "Fire occurs of a hypergolic
or pyrophoric nature"; 6-F, "Fuel, oxygen, and ignition source are provided
as separate entities"; and 6-G, "Combustible materials are present (fuel
source)."
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8D, 16D, 59D wi g? 61D.
REMARKS:
Fluids which are toxic or a 3sible source of fire would be a threat to crew
safety if lccated in pressur- ;ed inhabited areas of the spacecraft. Therefore,
it is desirable that system equipment that might be sources of the fluid leakage
be located in uninhabited areas, if at all possib?,
	 If this cannot be done,
then adequate shielding and precautions must be tr— ;,o ensure crew safety.
Propellant systems which use separate fuel and oxidizers should provide for
enough separation or shielding of the two so that leakage of one cannot come
into contact with the other.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
E. Explosion
c
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO • 10.22
TITLE: Prote.-tion of Temperature Critical Equipment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/ISS), Electrical Power, Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Equipment which has a critical temperature requirement should be protected by
a redundant or alternate temperature control capability.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of thermal control.
2. D2-113070-10 2 I'T-2 (Temperature Extremes), 8-G, "Equipment is inoperative
due to damage effects of fire."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8D and 10F.
REMARKS:
The thermal control system may provide control for many components throughout
the spacecraft. However, a failure may occur in the part of the thermal control
system associated with a particular component. Therefore, additional protection
of temperature critical equipment should be provided in the form of a redundant
thermal control loop or an alternate method of temperature control. Considera-
tion should also be given to providing a temperature controlled shut-off
device that will shut down the component operation when out-of-tolerance
temperatures occur.
i_ )
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes 	 NO. 10.23
TITLE: Self-Propagation of Fires
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Materials which are capable of self-propagation of fire should not be on-board
the space station in sufficient quantities or concentrations that ignition
would result in a hazardous condition.
REFERENCES:
1. D2	 '0 	 Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of fire, smoke,
toxicity.
2. D2-113070 ­10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 7-B, "Injury results from failure
to control fire."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8D, 18E, 47E.
REMARKS:
Effective fire extinguishing equipment and methods can probably be developed
for all but self-propagating materials. Ideally, there should be no self-
propagating materials on-board a space station. Realistically, this may not
be practi.ca4 considering the experimental and operational requirements. There-
fore, rigid measures should be taken to ensure that any self-propagating
materials on-board the space station are controlled so as to preclude the
development of a hazardous situation.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamirtation
6. Explosion
('11
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 40. 10.24
TITLE: Slow Opening High Pressure Oxygen Valves
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support 0ystem
(EC/LSS )
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Valves for oxygen systems of 3000 psi or higher should be slow opening and
closing to minimize the possibility of ignition of contaminants.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of oxygen.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 16D.
REMARKS:
Fast operating valves in high pressure oxygen systems can possibly result in
the ignition of contaminants that may be present in the valve or oxygen. This
could result in fire or valve failure and subsequent loss of oxygen.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
8. Loss of Vital Supplies
0
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO. 10.25
G	 TITLE:	 Spacecraft Thermal Protection
APPLICABLE SUBSYSYEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical Systems (S/M)
MIMISAFETY GUIDELINE:
The spacecraft thermal protection provisions should be consistent with the
orbital flight path type, orbital height, and inclination selected.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 1-I, "Injury results from dixect
exposure to exterior solar heat environment."
c
REMARKS:
The near-Earth thermal environment is a function of flight path, orbital height
and inclination. Design of thermal protection should provide for worst case
possible, unplanned or planned.
C
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes NQ.
 10.26
TITLE: Thermal Control Equipment Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Thermal control equipment whose operation is critical to crew safety should
have redundancy provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/ISS), for potential hazard of loss
of thermal control.
2. D2-11.3070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8D and 10F.
REMARKS:
Continuous operation of the thermal control system may be essential to the
operation of some equipment. To ensure continuous operation, redundancy
should be provided for critical thermal control equipment. The need for, and
the type of, redundancy will be dependent on the corrective maintenance time
required and its relation to the maximum allowable downtime for the equipment.
In any case, equipment which is located in uninhabited areas of the apace
station and would require EVA to maintain should have redundancy provided.
O
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO- 10.27
TITLE:	 Thermal Control Temperature Sensors
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Crew System, Electrical Power
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Temperature sensors should be provided at critical points in thermal control
systems to detect out-of-tolerance temperatures. Detection of temperatures
which deviate from the normal range should activate an alarm system to warn
the crew of the need for remedial action.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS) for potential hazard of loss
of thermal control.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 9-B, "Emergency fire control
action is not facilitated by the fire emergency warning system."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Prepositions 8D, 18D, 48H, 481.
kMARKS:Space station equipment that is designed to operate within specific temperature
ranges may be seriously deimaged if excessively high or low temperatures occur,
e.g., thermal control fluids might freeze. Therefore, critical temperature
locations in the system should be identified so they can be monitored with
appropriate sensors. Procedures should also be developed to instruct the
crew as to the corrective actions required when a critical temperature warning
is received.
,.
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HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes	 NO • 10.28
TITLE: Thruster Location
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS),
Communications and Data Mona 3ement, Electrical Power
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Attitude control thrusters should be located so that the exhaust will not cause
damage to other equipment or space station structure.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of exhaust
plume.
2. D2-113070-9,
 Logic Diagram Proposition 9D.
REMARKS:
If the exhaust plume from attitude control thrusters is allowed to impinge on
nearby equipment or structure, e.g., solar panels, antennas, experiment
apparatus, serious damage may result. Therefore, the exhaust plume effects
should be considered when determining the location of thrusters in relation to
other equipment nearby.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 5. Equipment Impact
O
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C HAZARD GROUP: Temperature Extremes 	 NO. 10.29
TITLE:	 Thruster Operation during EVA
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS), Crew
System, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Procedures should be established and design safeguards provided that will pre-
clude operation of thrusters when it might endanger crew members involved in
EVA.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of exhaust
plume.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8D, 9E and 32D.
REMARKS:
Whenever crew members are performing EVA there is a possibility that they will,
whether by necessity or inadvertently, get close enough to the thrusters that
their operation could damage pressure suits or associated equipment. Therefore,
procedures should be developed to ensure that the thra y^ers will not be operated
when personnel are nearby and/or system design should incorporate provisions
that will prevent the thrusters from being fired during any EVA.
c
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HAZARD GROUP:
	 Temperature Extremes NO.	 10.30
TITLE:
	 Thruster Temperature Monitor
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS:
	 Stability  and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Sensors should be provided to monitor the temperature of attitude control
thruster assemblies.	 The sensors should activate a visual and/or audible
alarm at the command and control center(s).
REFERENCES:
1.	 D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2.	 D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8D, 18D, 48H, and 481.
REMARKS:
Excessive temperatures can result in the failure of thrusters and possible
explosion.	 Also, some types of thrusters may not operate satisfactorily if
the temperature is too low or too high. 	 The crew should be warned of any
abnormal temperatures of the thrusters in time to take the necessary corrective
action to ensure crew safety.
Also applies to the following hazard group:	 6. Explosion
r
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HAZARD GROUP: Spacecraft Accelerations
	 NO. 11.1
TITLE: Angular Rate Monitor
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Angular rates of the spacecraft should be continuously monitored during attitude
change maneuvers. Detection of excessive angular rates should result in auto-
matic shut-down of operating thrusters.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 11E, 17E, 35E, 48H and 481.
REMARKS:
A control system or thruster failure could result in angular rates for the
spacecraft in excess of that considered acceptable for crew safety. Therefore,
provisions should be made for automatically shutting down operating thrusters
before this angular rate is attained. A visual/audible alarm indicating this
action should be displayed at the command and control center(s). Consider
providing manual override to the automatic controls.
C>
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HAZARD GROUP: Spacecraft Accelerations	 NO •	 11.2
TITLE: Automatic TiziW ing Correction
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: :stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
An automatic system for controlling thrusters to restore a tumbling spacecraft's
stability should be provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS); for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 4D, 17E and 35E.
REMARKS:
A system failure could result in the spacecraft tumbling at a rate which could
incapacitate the crew or inhibit crew movement. To recover from this contingency,
a capability to automatically control the spacecraft until stability is restored
should be provided. Therefore, an on-board automatic attitude control capability
is required which can be activated by a ground station if the spacecraft crew
is incapacitated, or alternately, can be easily activated at the spacecraft
command and control center(s) if some personnel movement is still possible.
O
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Spacecraft Accelerations 	 NO- 11.3
TITLE:
	 Component Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Redundancy should be provided for all components that are located outside
pressu.cized inharited areas and failure of which could result in a loss of
attitude control.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 1OF and 14B.
REMARKS:
EVA is a particularly hazardous activity which should be minimized. Therefore,
equipment that would require EVA to accomplish replacement or repair should
have redundancy provided to decrease the possibility of requiring EVA. The
amount of redundancy provided should take into consideration the component
reliability, accessibility for EVA replacement, maintenance time, and allowable
downtime. If remote manipulation units are available, replacement of a compo-
nent by remote manipulation could be considered. This may decrease the need
for redundancy, if the downtime constraints can be met.
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HAZARD GROUP: Spacecraft .`accelerations 	 NO •	 11.4
TITLE: Component Replacement for CMG's
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFELY GUIDELINE:
Control moment gyros (CMG's) should be designed so that the components most
subject to failure cad be replaced.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions lOG and 18E.
REMARKS
CMG's have been proposed for use in a number of space mission studies. Their
large size and mess impose problems when attempting replacement of failed gyros
or if spare gyros must be resupplied. The parts of the gyros most susceptible '-
to failure are relatively small and should present no spares provisioning
problems. Therefore, the CMG's should be designed for replacement of the
components most subject to failure.
0
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Spacecraft Accelerations	 NO •	 11.5
TITLE: Crew Restrictions During Space Base Spin-Up
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Crew members not directly involved in the spin-up operation should be restricted
either to refuge areas with unobstructed escape routes to docked logistic
vehicles, or to the logistic vehicles themselves.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 3.0, "Analysis of Operations."
REMARKS:
The intent of this guideline is to maximize the survivability of the crew
(or partial crew) in the event an emergency develops during the spin-up opera-
tion. This guideline recognizes that techniques to develop artificial gravity
are major uninvestigated areas of manned space activity, and it is directed
primarily at initial experiments. Also, this guideline assumes that experience
with spin-up/spin-down will have demonstrated that it would not be necessary
to evacuate the space base of all but essential personnel during these
operations.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Spacecraft, Accelerations	 NO.	 11.6
TITLE: Damage-Induced Motion
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control (SCS), Structures/
Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The SCS should have the capacity to counteract the undesired motion imparted by
fluid escaping through a hole in a compartment or pressure vessel.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS) fcr potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 7, "Meteoroid Penetration."
REMARKS:
If damage to a pressurized volume resulted in a hole in the pressure wall, the
escaping fluid would impart an undesired motion to the spacecraft. The magni-
tude of the motion would depend, among other things, on the volume of fluid
which escaped. The SCS should have the capacity to counteract all the
motion imparted by escape of all the fluid in that pressurized volume contain-
ing the greatest quantity of fluid. A stuck-open pressure vent valve is "damage"
in the sense of this guideline.
l)
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Spacecraft Accelerations 	 NO •	 11.7
TITLE:
	 Meuuel/Automatic Control Interlocks
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Interlocks should be provided to prevent simultaneous manual and automatic
operation of the attitude control system.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 9C, 11E and 53D.
REMARKS:
If manual control were attempted while automatic control was still operating
it is possible that the result could be a serious loss of attitude control.
This could be prevented by the incorporation of en interlock device or circuit
into the systems
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HAZARD GROUP: Spacecraft Accelerations 	 NO. 11.8
TITLE: Manual Control of SCS Thrusters
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The spacecraft crew should be provided the capability to manaalll activate
and control both primary and redundant thrusters.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 17E, 18E and 35E.
FSi
 of spacecraft attitude would be expected normally to be done automati-
 It is possible for failures to occur that could result in malfnction
ure of the automatic system. In this case, it would be advisable to have
w able to manually activate and control both primary and redundant
attitude control thrusters.
0
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP 
s Spacecraft Accelerations 	 NO • 11.9
TITLE: On-Board Crew Complement During Space Station Spin-Up
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Only those crew members directly involved with the operation should remain
aboard the space station during spin-up, and until the station has been
stabilized and considered safe.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, paragraph 3.2.9.
F
REMARKSi
intent of this guideline is to minimize the number of crew members who are
sed to the hazards associated with the "spin-up" operation. Some of these
hazards may include: (1) Loss of stability during the operation w4th possible
excessive structural loads resulting in bas
interface seals resulting in loss of a habi
compartments; (3) Line rupture or intercoms
hazardous fluids; and (4) Failure of equips
the equipment to shift or move uncontrollat
Depending upon an assessment of the initial
achieved, this guideline or some modificati
during "spin-down," or subsequent spin-up c
This guideline could be demented by init
essention to perform space station activati
exces3 personnel should already
 be aboard (
sequent spin-up), they could be temporarily
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Spacecraft Accelerations	 NO • il.10
TITLE: Propellant Flow Shut-off Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSMMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control Systcva (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A means for stopping propellant flow to failed open thrusters should be provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2. De-1130'10-9, Logic Analysis, Propositions 11E, 17E and 35E.
RETSA!:
uster that fails to shut off after operating could result in tumbling of
the spacecraft with consequent danger of incapacitating the crew. Therefore,
some alternate means of shutting off the propellant flow should be provided.
Consideration should be given to automatic monitoring of thruster firing
duration and to providing visual/audible alarm or automatic shut-down of all
thrusters if duration exceeds a specified limit.
0
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP:
	 Spacecraft Accelerations NO. u,u
TITLE:
	 Torques from Venting
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS:
	
Stability and Control (SCS), Structures/
Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Outlets should be designed so that fluids being vented overboard do not impose
any torque on the spacecraft.
REFERENCES:
1.	 D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS) for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control:
REMARKS:
Fluids vented overboard could act to impart undesired and unexpected motion
to the spacecraft.	 If this occurred during a hazardous operation, it could
contribute to accidents.
1
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Spacecraft Accelerations 	 NO- 11. ]L2
TITLE:
	 Propellfnt Storage Tanks Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Propellants should be stored in more than one tank or other storage device.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of loss of
at-itude control.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 10F and 11E.
REMARKS:
An adequate supply of propellants is essential to continued operation of the
SCS. Therefore, the propellant supply system should be designed so that a
single failure will not result in a total loss of the propellant supply.
Determination of the number and sizes of the propellant tanks to be used should
involve consideration of the logistics resupply requirements. If propellant
tanks are to be exchanged during resupply, the size cf the tanks may dictate
additional requirements for the handling and transfer of propellant tanks from
the resupply vehicle to the space station.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 6. Explosion
0
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO •	 • 1
TITLE: Accessways
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr Structures/Mechanical (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Accessways between and within compartments should be sized in such a mariner
that an IVA-suited crew member will be allowed access to normally used areas.
z
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section % "Traffic Patterns Analysis."
REMARKS:
The intent of this guideline is to assure that accessway size does not restrict
activities which require an NA suit to be worn ., e.g. escape through a
hazardous area, and damage control. The term "compartment" in this guideline
refers to the enclosed volume obtained when pressure-tight hatches are secured.
- 253 -
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 E 12,2
TITLE: Airlock Hatch Operation
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Airlock hatches should be capable of being operated from either side and at
least two methods for operating the hatches should be provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of no airlock
capability.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8C and 80B.
REMARKS:
There is a possibility that because of a failure or a crewman being injured, an
airlock hatch could not be opened from one side. Therefore, the hatch should
be capable of being operated from both sides. In the event of a failure which
prevents a hatch from being opened from either side by the normal method, an
alternate and separate means for emergency operation of the hatches should be
provided.
0
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO 12.3
TITLE: Airlock Pressurization Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Space station airlocks should have redundant pressurization capability.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of no airlock
capability.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8C and 10F.
REMAR KS
A failure in the airlock pressurization system could result in crew members
being unable to enter the space station without depressurizing the adjoining
compartment. In case of an emergency ., that procedure may take too much addition-
al time and also would result in loss of atmosphere. To ensure -use of the
airlock at a critical time, i.e., entry from EVA, a redundant means for
pressurizing the airlock should be provided.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO - 12.4
TITLE: Airlock Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A space station should be provided with more than one airlock leading to the
exterior of the station.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of no
airlock capability.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 80B.
REMARKS:
It is assumed that there will be redundant pressurization capability for
airlocks, primarily to ensure re-entry of crew members on EVA. However, there
are failures which could occur that would prevent use of the airlock for either
exit or entry. To ensure an airlock capability at all times,more than one
airlock should be provided. The number will depend upon the size and configura-
tion of the space station, the crew size, and the amount of EVA expected.
0
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO. 12.5
TITLE: Alternate Command and Control Center
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONF Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
An alternate command and control center should be provided in the space base,
possibly within the crew refuge area, to ensure continuation of a minimum
number of functions which are vital for bast ccntrol and crew life support, in
the event the primary command and control center is rendered incapable of
providing these functions.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 3.5, "Damage Containment and
Control."
REMARKS:
A dual function of the alternate center could be to provide direction for
implementing damage containment and control or emergency procedures as required.
At a minimum, the center should be manned during all hazardous operations.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 N - 12.6
TITLE: Assistance to Injured Personnel
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations, structures/Mechanical Systems
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A capability should be provided to allow entry into a compartment, where fire
or other emergency exists, to effect rescue of incapacitated crew members or to
combat a fire. The means of entry and the procedures involved should assure
that the emergency does not escalate or spread to other locations due to the
entry.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10 0 FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 7-H, "Injuries to crew member
retard escape, and rescue attempt is ineffective," and 19-E, "Compartment
escape route is obstructed due to fire."
REMARKS:
An "injury" situation could escalate to a "fatal" situation if prompt assistance
is not available to the injured member or if the rescue attempt is not conducted
in a proper manner.
O
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO. 12.7
TITLE: Attitude Indication Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Redundancy should be provided for displays used to show spacecraft attitude or
attitude changes.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Proposition 10F.
REMARKS:
Continuous knowledge of the spacecraft's attitude and rates of attitude change
is important in-assessing the performance of the attitude control system. To
ensure continuous display of accurate attitude information, even if a failure
occurs, active redundant attitude indication should be provided. If a positive
means of showing failure of the attitude indicator can be provided, stand-by
redundancy should be considered.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO - 12.8
TITLE: Authority to Proceed with Hazardous and Certain Other Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYS11EMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Mission rules should include the requirement that control center "authority to
proceed" be obtained immediately prior to the initiation (by any crewman) of
any activity which is hazardous either by itself, or when performed in conjunc-
tion with other base activities being conducted simultaneously.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6,
 Supporting Analyses, Section 3.0, "Analysis of Operations."
REMARKS:
The intent of this guideline is to ensure that control center operator(s) main-
tain cognizance of all hazardous or potentially hazardous activities being
conducted aboard the station/base, and hence minimize the probability of
occurrence of unforeseen hazards for which no emergency procedures exist.
O
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO- 12,9
C11 TITLE: Cargo Transfer Equipment Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Redundancy should be provided for equipment required for resupply cargo
transfer.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of cannot
transfer resupply cargo.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 7 -G, "Damage results from logistic
support operations."
3• D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 48E.
Fr7es
upply
 
equipment or permanently installed means may be used , to transferS
 cargo from a logistics vehicle to the space station; e.g., pumping of
through interconnecting plumbing. If this method fails the resupply
vehicle would be unable to transfer its cargo. Therefore, an alternate method
should be provided for transferring supplies in that type of situation.
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HAZARD GROUP: 	 General NO-	 12.10
TITLE:
	 Closed Circuit Television Monitoring
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSs Communications and Data Management (CDM)
Operations ,p Experiments
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A closed circuit television system with strategically located cameras should be
provided command and control center operator(s) real-time visual information on
hazardous activities/operations.
REFERENCES:
1.	 D2-113070-6 1 Supporting Analyses., Section 3.0, "Analysis of Operations;"
and Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Analysis."
REMARKS
The intent of this guideline is to provide a visual back-up system which would
complement other instrumentation at the command and control center(s) to alert
operators of impending hazards. 	 Monitoring by optical means could also be
considered.
D2-113070-5
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General NO •	 12.11
TITLE:
	 Command Personnel Location Restrictions
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS:
	 Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Simultaneous occupancy (other than momentary) by the Spacecraft Commander and
his Deputy, of those compartments or locations which ai •e judged to have the
highest safety risk probability 	 should be minimized, or precluded if possible.
REFERENCES:
1.	 DE-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 3.0, "Analysis of Operations."
REMARKS:
The intent of this guideline is to avert the possibility of serious injury to
or loss of both commanders in the event of an emergency. This guideline could
be implemented by prudent preparation of crew timelines, in which this guideline
would become a prime consideration.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO- 12.12
TITLE: Communication Equipment Commonality
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Communications and Data Management (CDM)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Equipment in the space station for external voice and data communications should
have as much commonality as practicable with the equipment used in the logistics
vehicles and Earth-return vehicles.
REFERE NCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Ara.lysis (CDM), for potential hazards of loss of
external voice and data communications.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 9D.
REMARKS:
Equipment for external voice and data communications will be required on all
vehicles used to transport men and supplies between the Earth and space stations.
By using the same equipment in all the vehicles, a built-in emergency or backup
communications capability will be available to the space station. In some
situations, the common equipment in one vehicle might even be used as a source
for a needed replacement in another vehicle. Trade studies or are analysis of
each space system concept will be required to determine if this commonality
of equipment woula satisi*y redundancy requirements.
O
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02-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO • 12.13
TITLE: Compartmentation
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS:
	
All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The space station/base areas inhabited by the crew should consist of two or
more independently pressurizable compartments with more than one exit from
each compartment.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1 -C, "Crew members are exposed to
decompression;" and 8-H, "Compartment hatch hinders escape due to batch
failure or improper design."
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP and EC/IS), for potential hazards
of fire, smoke, toxicity and loss of cabin pressure.
3• D2-113070-9,
 Logic Diagram, Proposition 34C.
REMARKS:
This guideline represents a conclusion reached independently by most of the
tasks in the study, in addition to those referenced. The term "compartment" as
used here,, and generally in the study, refers to a volume which can be pressurized
and depressurized independently of the rest of the station. In this sense, of
course, an "airlock" is a "compartment." No conclusion was reached as to the
specific number of compartments except that the number should probably be
greater than tvo. Extensive trade studies will be necessary to establish the
optimum number.
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	 [NO - 12.14
TITLE: Compartment Environmental Status
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr Communications and Data Management System,
Operations Experiments
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Means should be provided for determining the conditions existing in an
environmentally isolated area before it is entered. Environmental conditions
(particularly pressure) should be equalized on both sides of the compartment
hatch prior to its being opened.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 5, "Traffic Pattern .6ma].ysis."
2. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC 00134, September 1969, Hazard No. 64.
tMAAS:
ssumed that the station/base will have compartmentswhich can be
ely isolated from the rest of the station. In such cases, before a
crewman enters the compartment, he should be able to determine that no
hazardous conditions have developed, and that no intercompartmental pressure
differential exists which would set up a pressure gradient at the hatch.
Opening a sealed hatch which leads to a compartment of either higher or lower
pressure could create a hazard for the crew member(s) involved.
O
0
266 -
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO • 12.15
TITLE: Computer Equipment Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The principal space station/base computer and the associated equipment, e.g.,
data adapter, that is essential to the computer operation should have redundancy
provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CDM), for potential hazard of loss of
computer function.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 10F.
REMARKS:
It is assumed that the space station/base will have a computerized capability
which is essentially the "brains" of all systems. Loss of this capability could
ser;ously degrade operations and jeopardize crew safety. Therefore, it is
necessary that the computer functions and associated equipment be capable of
continuous operation, which can be provided through redundancy. For additional
backup protection, alternate mcdes of operation for critical computer functions
should be provided.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO - 12.16
TITLE: Continuous Attitude Indication
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSt Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Continuous indication of spacecraft attitude or attitude changes should be
provided the control center operator.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, NBC 00134, September 1969, Hazard No. 6.
r7RER KSprotect against either a failure in the primary attitude display system,ora necessity for the crew to temporarily switch the primary system to display
other than basic flight parameters, a form of redundancy should be considered
to ensure that a continuous indication of theae basic parameters is a3ailable.
O
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO • 12.17
TITLE: Crew Activity Restrictions
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations
SAFELY GUIDELINE:
Crew activity should be restricted during transfer of volatile, flammable^or
explosive materials either between docked spacecraft or within a space vehicle.
These restrictions should apply to the use of high voltage equipment, conduct
of high temperature experiments, or other activity which would involve a
potential source of ignition in the immediate neighborhood of the material
transfer route.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Paragraph 3.1.6, "Additional Manning or
Crew Rotation Missions."
REMARKS:
This guideline could be partially implemented by strict adherence to crew
timelines and also by rules and safety regulations.
C}
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO- 12.18
TITLE: Crew Distribution
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSt Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The number of crew members in any compartment at one time should be held to
the minimum necessary to perform the required functions.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analysis, Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Analysis."
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-I, "Portion of crew is exposed to
decompression."
REMARKS:
In the event of a serious emergency it will probably not be possible to abso-
lutely guarantee that all crew members will survive. This guideline is intended
to provide for survival of the maximum number. The term "compartment" in this
guideline refers to the enclosed volume obtained when pressure-tight hatches
are secured. It is recognized that operational factors may lead to the gathering
of several. crew members for recreational or other purposes (e.g., briefings).
Also, crew-oriented activities, such as eating and sleeping, may result in
undesirable concentrations of crew in areas devoted to those purposes.
O
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04
HAZARD GROUP: 
General	 NO 12.19
TITLE: Crew Movement
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSt Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Crew members should be restricted from movement about the station other than
within specified and assigned areas.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Analysis."
REMARKS:
Uncontrolled and random crew movement could result in undesirable concentra-
tions of the crew. Also .9 it could unnecessarily expose crew members to hazard-
ous operations or locations and could cause distraction and mistakes on the
part of others.
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	
NO 12.20
TITLE: Crew-0riented Art.ds
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Me areas in which crew members spend the majority of their time, e.g., state-
rooms, dining facilities, personal hygiene, exercise, and recreation areas,
should be located and designed to be the safest parts of the station.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section % "Traffic Pattern Analysis."
REMARKS:
About two-thirds of crew members' time will bespent in activities oriented to
crew health and well being. Crew members will of necessity congregate in the
areas devoted to those activities which may give, from the safety viewpoint, an
undesirable concentration of the crew in those areas. Many inherently hazardous
conditions, activities, materials or equipment will necessarily exist in the
space station, but proper design should place many of them in areas other than
those devoted to high crew concentrations.
0
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: 
General	 NO. 12.21
TITLE: Crew Performance of Complex Tasks
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr Crew System, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Tasks and schedules should be designed so that complex or highly skilled
performance is not required of crew members immediately upon arousal from
sleep, and to the maximum extent possible,do not require more than one work
period to complete. The responsibility for critical actions in emergencies
should be assigned to on-duty personnel.
REFERENCES:
1. Aerospace Medicine, Volume 40, No. 7, page 723, July 1969•
2. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC 0013, September 1969, Hazard No. 38.
REMARKS:
Experience and observation, confirmed by the study of Reference 1, indicate that
performance tends to be poor and relatively unpredictable, especially in the
case of sudden arousal from sleep in an emergency condition, for the first few
minutes after awakening. Furthermore, when relieving work crews are required
to continue complex tasks already in progress, they frequently commit procedural
errors or make incorrect judgment decisions due to misunderstanding of the work
already done. If a multi-shift task is unavoidable, crew rotation should be
staggered such that at least part of the crew is thoroughly familiar with work
done by the previous shift.
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HAZARD GROUP: General	
NO • 12.22
TITLE: Critical Caution and Warning Alarms
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Communication and Data Management (CDS)
Crew System (CS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Critical visual/aadible caution and warning alarms should be displayed in all
inhabited compartments.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of crew injury
or illness.
2. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 18D, 45E, 48$ and 481.
REMARKS:
Some hazardous situations or event ,
 that occur may have the potential of
affecting a number, or all, of the space station inhabited areas. The caution
and warning alarms associated with these events should therefore be displayed
in all inhabited areas so the crew can take the necessary emergency or remedial
action.
O
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HAZARD GROUP:	 General NO-	 12.23
TITLE:	 Docking Mechanism Redundancy
d.
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSt 	 Structures/ Mechanical Systems
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The docking mechanism should include redundant or secondary features so that
docking can be completed if the primary mechanism fails.
REFERE NCES:
1.	 DP-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 3, "Analysis of Operations."
REMARKS:
Docking mechanisms could be damaged during docking or could fail otherwise.
Redundancy or secondary mechanisms would permit docking to be completed even
though the primary system had failed. 	 This feature may not be necessary if
there are sufficient docking ports available to ensure that docking can be
completed at another port if the mechanism fails in one.
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l)HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO • 12.24TITLE: Emergency Communications System
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Communications and Data Management (CDM)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
An independent emergency communications system shouted be provided for directing
and controlling operational activities in emergency situations.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CDM), for potential hazard of loss of
internal voice communications.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 10F.
r
MA S
rgency situation may occur that results in the normal intercom system
inoperative; e.g., power failure or failure at main intercom station at
the command and control center(s). If this happens, it would be essential that
some means of communication throughout the space station compartments be pro-
vided so an organized and coordinated effort can be initiated toward correcting
the emergency. Therefore, an emergency communications system should be provided
which is totally independent of the normal system.
O
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c
HAZARD GROUP:	 General NO •	 12.25
TITLE:
	 Emergency Crew Evacuation
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS:
	
Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A sufficient number of operable logistic vehicles should be docked to the space
station at all times to accommodate every on-board crew member in the event
emergency evacuation is required.
REFERENCES:
1.	 D2-113070-6 1 Supporting Analyses, Paragraph 3.3,"Logistic Vehicle/Tug
Operation."
2.	 D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 10F.
REMARKS:
Initially, experimental programs involving high crew risks should include
provisions for emergency rescue of the entire crew. As confidence levels,
reliability of equipment, procedures, etc., increase with experience, this
approach may be revised.
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HAZARD GROUP: Ger eral	 [NO , 12.26
TITLE: Emergency EVA Communications
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS), Communications and Data
Management
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
An independent, emergency communications capability should be provided between
EVA personnel and the personnel monitoring the EVA.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of EVA equip-
ment failure.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 18D, 18E, 45E, 4811 and 48 I.
REMARKS:
An emergency situation may occur that results in the normal EVA-space station
voice communications system becoming inoperative. Since EVA is a particularly
hazardous activity, there should be provided an emergency backup method of
communicating with EVA personnel.
c>
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO • 12.27
TITLE: Emergency Lighting for EVA
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS), Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
An emergency lighting system should be provided to assist EVA personnel in
performing their tasks or to facilitate rescue of EVA personnel.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of EVA
equipment failure.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 46B, 78G and 80B.
REMARKS:
An emergency situation may occur where V is necessary to provide assistance to,
or rescue, personnel involved in EVA. Iz this situation occurs during the dark
part of an orbit and the normal lighting system is inadequate or inoperative,
a means of providing emergency lighting would be required to properly carry
out rescue operations or assist the WA personnel in continuing their planned
tasks.
c
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	
NO - 12.28
TITLE: Emergency Procedures and Training
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Periodic drills for all personnel should be devised, and conducted in response
to unscheduled simulated emergencies, so that crew proficiency is maintained
in emergency procedures.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 3, "Analysis of Operations;" and
Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Analysis."
2. 1)2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 6-F, "Procedures are inadequate due to
lack of emergency training;" and FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 7-I, "Escape
action is not facilitated by fire emergency procedures."
3. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of fire,
smoke, toxicity.
4. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 4C.
FS:
s a strong possibility that a portion of the crew on large future space-
ay have minimal astronaut training, including use of and adherence to
emergency procedures. Periodic drills should at least partially compensate for
their limited Emergency situation training. Further, such drills would permit
evaluation of drill conduct and the results should provide indications as to
the efficacy of operational safety measures.
c^
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HAZARD GROUP: (Rmeral
	
NO - 12.29
TITLE: Emergency Procedures (Fire)
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
"Fire resistant" areas should be established to provide haven from fire.
Emergency procedures should be established to identify such things as optimum
routes to haven from any area and all personnel should be trained in these
emergency procedures.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-27-F, "An external a7-N, "Established f7-P, "Fire emergenc
F;MAS:
engendered by fix
e deaths than do
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would not permit themse
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the likelihood of survi
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO - 12.30
TITLE: Escape Routes
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr Structures/Mechanical Systems, Environmental
Control Life Support System EC LSS
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Each compartment should have a minimum of two escape routes, which should not
terminate in a common compartment.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6 1 Supporting Analyses, Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Ay)n lysis."
REMARKS:
The intent of this guideline is to minimize the possibility of a crewman
becoming isolated in a compartment by an emergency which blocks his escape.
The term "compartment" in this guideline refers to the enclosed volume obtained
when pressure-tight hatches are secured. The term "escape route" in this
guideline refers to any route that can effectively be used to escape from an
emergency condition.
O
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HAZARD GROUP: Generga 	 NO. 12,31
TITLE: EVA Emergency Procedures
APPLICABLE SUSSYSIEMS/FUNCTIONSt e, System (CS), operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Procedures should be established and training provided the crew which will
enable them to cope with any foreseeable cor.tingency that might arise during
EVA.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of EVA
equipment failure.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 12E.
REMARKS:
In the event of an emergency during EVA operations, emergency procedures should
be in effect to ensure that the necessary actions are taken to preclude a
hazardous situation from developing further until remedial measures can be
taken to restore normal. operations.
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO, 12.32
TITLE: External Communications Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Communications and Data Management (CDM)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
External communications--e.g., voice and data between the space station and the
Earth, logistics vehicles, independentmodules, and EVA personnel--equipment,
the operation of which is essential to crew safety, should have redundancy
provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CSM), for potential hazards of loss of
external voice and data communications.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 4D and 10F.
REMARKS:
Bassentially continuous operation, i.e., operation which cannot tolerate the
downtime required to replace a faulty component, of some external communications
equipment may be necessary to ensure crew safety. Redundancy should be provided
for this equipment and, in particular, redundancy should be provided for equip-
ment located in uninhabited areas, or exterior to the space stet{on, that would
require EVA to replace oz- maintain; e.g., antennas.
O
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO- 12.33
TITL:+ Fire Alarm
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
An adequate fire warning system should be provided. The warning should be
activated by smoke or fumes, as well as heats and should warn the entire station.
The precise location of the fire should be provided, as a minimum to the command
and control center(s). All segments of the warning system should be resistant
to temperature extremes, decompression/overpressure or shock and should be
self-indicating when failed.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 9-C, "Emergency manual pro-
cedures are inadequate to control fire;" and 10-D, "The fire warning
system is inadequate at the time required."
2. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Analysis."
3. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of fire,
smoke, toxicity.
4. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8D, 8H and 45E.
REMARKS:
Due to the possible seriousness of afire, all occupants should be warned of
the situation as soon as possible. The co®and and control center(s), which is
knowledgeable of conditions in all areas, should be responsible to direct
combating of the fire and rescue of personnel as required. This does not pre-
clude delegation (or automatic delegation) of that responsibility to anther
authority or location if it is expedient under the circumstances. Smoke or
fumes may indicate the existence of an overheated condition which has not yet
broken out into actual flame. Therefore, any warning alarm system should be
capable of responding to these factors.
- 
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO, 12.34
TITLE: Fluid Quantity Usage Monitor
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/ISS), Stability and Control System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A means for monitoring fluid quantity usage should be provided to permit the
crew to detect excessive consumption rates and low remaining supply levels.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 9E.
[RE:
ace station crew should be able to monitor the fluid quantity regularly
ermine if an excessive amount of fluid is being used; e.g., due to leakage.
Although an atmosphere contaminants detection system should detect contamination
due to fluid leakage within the spacecraft, a means of detecting leakage external
to the pressurized portion of the spacecraft is desirable.
n
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO - 12.35
TITLE: Hazardous Resupply Operations Monitoring
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations, Communications and Data
Management System
SAFETY GUIDELINE;
The commencement; behavior, and c4
operations (e.g., pressurized liq
indicated at the command and cont:
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10 ) FT-1 (Decompress
gas transfer."
RE MARKS
The intent of this guideline is tc
operations considered to be hazarc
guideline may be extended to incli
operations.
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO, 12.36
TITLE;
	 Health and Safety Officer
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Overall health and safety considerations and responsibility should be assigned
to specific members of the crew.
REFERENCES:
1. AFSC Design Handbook, System Safety, AFSCDH 1 -6, Headquarters, AF Systems
Commend, January 20, 1969.
2. MIL-S-38130, Safety Engineering of Systems and Associated Subsystems and
Equipment, General Requirements, 1 March 1967.
3. AFSCM 127-1, Safety Systems Management, April 7, 1967.
4. System Safety Data Plan CDRL 68-01-T, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston,
August 15, 1968.
REMARKS:
The burden of identifying and enforcing health and safety considerations in a
mission should rest with specific crew members. Continuity of this responsibility
should be assured by the spacecraft commander.
l)
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C
HAZARD GROUP:	 General NO. 12.37
TITLE:
	 Incoming Vehicle Emergency
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS:
	 Operations
A
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Standard operating procedure should include the provisions for abort for all
incoming vehicles having an emergency on-board which would jeopardize the
parent spacecraft.
REFERENCES:
1.	 D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 3-L, "Fire occurs in logistics
vehicle."
REMARKS:
It is desirable to prevent the spread to the parent spacecraft of emergency
conditions occurring aboard incoming vehicles.
	 Consistent with this guideline,
escape/rescue capabilities for the incoming vehicle should also be developed.
C
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO. 12.38
TITLE: Independent Emergency Power Scarce
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
An emergency power source which is completely independent of the primary power
source should be provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of loss of
electrical power.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 6B.
REMARKS:
Because of the extremely critical relationship of electrical power to the total
operation of the space station and safety of the crew, it is suggested that
an independent emergency power source be provided. This power source would be
used only in emergencies (loss of primary power source) and would have the
capability to power the minimum equipment requirements for crew safety.
O
- 290 -
D2-113070-5
r-
	 HAZARD GROUP: General
	 [NO - 12.39
TITLE:
	 Initial Manning of Space Station/Base
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
An advance inspection team composed of a minimum number of the initial manning
crew should check the habitability of an unmann ed spacecraft before the remain-
ing crew members transfer into it.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Paragraph 3.1.4, "Crew Transfer."
REMARKS:
This guideline would also apply to a manned space vehicle with which
communications have been lost on both the docking vehicle and ground tracking
stations. It implies also that appropriate protective gear be provided the
inspection team.
yi
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	
NO 12.40
TITLE: Inoperative Sensing Systems
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSs All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A capability should be provided for the crew to immediately detect a failed
(or faulty) sensing device or measurement system which provides critical
operating information.
REFERENCES:
1. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC 00134, September 1969, Hazard No. 214.
2. D2-113070 -11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/ISS), for potential hazard of
atmosphere contamination.
REMARKS:
Inability to differentiate between a detection or measurement system failure,
and an actual equipment malftiuiction, could precipitate improper and possibly
hazardous crew reaction.
c ^^
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 ENO 12.41
TITLE: Intercom Station Monitor
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Communications and Data Management (CDM)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A visual warning should be provided at a central control console to alert the
operator whenever an intercom station failure occurs.
REFERE NCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CDM), for potential hazard of loss of
internal voice communications.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 18D.
k
REAR KS
 
provide the desired degree of crew safety it is necessary that the intercom
system operate when needed. Therefore, if an intercom station is not operating
satisfactorily, this information should be provided to the crew so corrective
action can be initiated.
V
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO- 12.42
TITLE: Intercom System
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/PUNCT1ONSr Operations, Communications and Data
Management
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A highly reliable intercommunication system should be provided within the
spacecraft. System features should include positive measures to protect the
system integrity against those events, e.g., fire, which would tend to disable
or jeopardize the spacecraft.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 15-H, "Fire results in failure
of communications and data management," and 15-E, "Failure of a function
necessary for crew well-being results in injury to personnel."
REMARKS:
Should an emergency condition develop aboard the spacecraft, good communica-
tions between all areas would enhance the coordinated effort needed to contain
and control the event.	
R
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO 1.2.43
TITLE:
	 Lighting
APPL;%*-.ABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Adequate lighting should be provided to enable crew members to perform all
expected operational and maintenance tasks both inside and outside the space
station.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of crew injury
or illness.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 10G, 46B 9 48F, 48H and 78G.
REMARKS:
There are many not normally lighted areas in a space station where operational
and maintenance tasks might be performed. Therefore, some method of lighting
(permanently installed or portable) should be provided to allow the crew to
safely perform their activities. Emergency lighting provisions should be
located at all critical operational areas to ensure capability of carrying
on basic space station functions even if failure of the primary lighting system
occurs. This should also include battery powered lights, e.g., flashlights,
that are located strategically throughout the space station.
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO•
 12 ,44
TITLE: Location of Intercom Stations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Communications and Data Management (CDM)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
At least one intercom station should be provided in each separately pressurizable
space station compartment that will be occupied by the crew.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CIM), for potential hazard of loss of
internal voice communications.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 9C.
REMARKS:
Continuous awareness of the status of the crew is necessary to ensure the
safety of the crew. Therefore, a communications capability between each
separate compartment that will be occupied by the crew and the command and
control center(s) should be required.
O
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO - 12.45
TITLE: Maintenance Capability
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The maintenance equipment, procedures) and skills required to competently
analyze and isolate component failures and accomplish the needed replacement
or repair should be provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of inadequate
maintenance capability.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 9F, 10G, 18D, 18E, 47E and 50E.
REMARKS:
It is assumed that suitable provisioning of replacement components (spares)
will be done. Satisfactory use of these spares is dependent on having the_
correct maintenance equipment and tools to accomplish the replacement or repair,
and adequate skills and equipment to analyze failure situations and to locate
the failed component. Therefore, the on-board crew should be trained to handle
any anticipated failures; easily used maintenance procedures should be avail,Ir-le.
Fault isolation capability should be provided for rapid detection of faulty
components, and equipment should be provided to permit easy replacement of
failed components with a very low possibility of human error. Qualified
technicians for all space station systems should be available on the Earth for
consultation with space station crews whenever required.
c
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO • 12.46
TITLE: Minimizing EVA Requirements
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Space station equipment, systems and configurations should be designed to
minimize the requirements for EVA operations.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of crew injury
or illness.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 10G and 28G.
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HAZARD GROUP: 
General	 NO' 12.47
TITLE: Monitoring of Docked Vehicles
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSt Communications and Data Management
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Critical subsystems of docked logistic vehicles/tugs should be continuously
monitored in the parent spacecraft by control center operator(s), with appro-
priate aural/visual warning provisions to indicate out-of-tolerance conditions.
REFERE NOES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting analyses, Paragraph 3.3, "Logistic Vehicle/Tug
Operations."
REMARKS:
Space vehicles with potential escape/rescue capabilities, such as the logistic
vehicle/tug, should be maintained at a high degree of readiness in the event
emergency evacuation of the crew is required.
C
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HAZARD GROUP: General 	 NO - 12.48
TITLE: Monitoring of EVA/NA
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/PUNCTIONSr Operations, Crew System (CS), Environmental
Control/Life Support System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
All EVA and NA activities shall be backed up and monitored by a suited crew
member who is positioned to assist immediately, if necessary, and by another
crew member in a responsible position within the pressurized area of the
spacecraft who is also monitoring the activities.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6, Sup
2. D2-113070-11, Su
equipment failur
3. D2-113070-10, FT
failure of press
4. D2-113070-9, Log
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO. 12.49
TITLE: Periodic Communications Subsystem Check
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Communications and Data Management,
Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A two-way communications check should be made between the control center and
all occupied compartments, logistic vehicles or free-flying laboratories in
the event a "no-communications" period exceeds some specified time.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-06 , Supporting Analyses, Paragraph 3.1. 4 , "Crew Transfer."
REMARKS
The int nt of this guideline is to verify the continual operability of the
basic 'immunications Subsystem, as well as to keep the control center apprised
of crew disposition and status. This guideline could be implemented by incor-
porating it into the crew's - — mal operating procedures.
See also Guideline 12.63.
C
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	
NO • 12.50
TI LE. Premature Subsystem Arming or Delayed Disarming
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Spacecraft subsystems should be armed only when they are to be used, and
immediately disarmed when their function is no longer required, or subsequent
use will not be for a prolonged period.
REFERENCES:
1. Space Flight HE
and 62.
2. D2,-113070-11,
plume.
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO - 12.51
TITLE: pressurized Free Volume
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSs Crew System (CS), Structures/Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The pressurized compartments of a space station should have adequate free
volume (not occupied by equipment or structure) to provide the crew freedom
of movement and a psychological and physiological environment that is
commensurate with their orbital stay duration.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of crew
injury or illness.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 48B and 48E.
REMARKS:
Many studies have been made into the free space volumetric requirements to
provide a satisfactory habitable environment for the crew members. Careful
consideration should be given to the results of these in the design of space
stations, giving particular attention to the expected mission duration and/or
maximum expected orbital stay time of individual crew members.
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HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO • 12.52
TITLE: propellant Leak Detection
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS),
Environmental Control/Life Support System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Leak detectors should be provided for propellant handling equipment located in
unpressurized areas of the space station. The detectors should activate an
alarm at the command and control center(s).
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential liazard of propellant
leakage.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8H and 48H.
RTMA S
assumed that there will be equipment and procedures for detecting
pere contamination, including fluid leakage, in pressurized areas of the space
station. In unpressurized areas, leakage could go undetected for some time
if a method of detection is not used. Therefore, leakage detectors should be
provided at potential leakage points. The detector should warn the crew when
leakage occurs so that the appropriate corr-ctive action can be initiated.
O
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO 12.53
TITLE: propellant Quantity and Usage
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A visual audible alarm should be provided to warn the crew of excessive
propellant use rates and low propellant quantity.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of propellant
leakage.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 9E, 9G and 48H.
REMARKS:
The space
if allowed
supply unt
developed
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO - 12.54	 J
TITLE: Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements (QQPR)
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Selection of personnel to man a space station/base should be preceded by a
comprehensive analysis of all the candidates' background and the skills required,
in order to satisfy the objectives of the mission.
REFERF',JCES:
1. WL D-26239A, Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Informa-
tion Data, Ap_il 14 2 1961 2 AF Systems Command.
REMARKS:
The qualitative and quantitative analysis of candidate crew members should
in
	
the education, professional history, health history, motivation, and
any other parameter that impacts on the skills required to satisfy the cross-
section of disciplines needed. to operate a space station/base. A rroduct of
this analysis would be a determination of the different skills and numbers that
should be part of a crew, such as professionals (e.g., doctors, dentists, nurses,
engineers, etc.); technicians (e.g., machinists, clinical chemists, electricians,
mechanics, etc.); non-technical workers (e.g., cooks, general repairmen,
janitors, etc.).
0
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C
HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO • 12.55
TITLE: Replacement Component Installation
APPLICABLE JUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Replacement components should be designed so that it is physically impossible
to inadvertently install a component incorrectly.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for po
maintenance capability.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 10D.
REMARKS:
In the past there have been numerous incidents of
installed wrong with subsequent harmful and someti
fore, components which are replaceable should have
that makes it physically impossible to incorrectly
that prevents a system from being operated if a co
installed incorrectly.
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HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO. 12.56
TITLE: Replacement Component Provisioning
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/'FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Spares should be provided for all components that have been designed to be
replaceable and for which there is a probability of failure.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of inadequate
maintenance capability.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 9G and 18E.
REMARKS:
Past studies have shown that the success of long-duration manned space missions
will depend on full utilization of man's capability for isolating failures and
replacing faulty components. Therefore, it is necessary that adequate spare-
by provided on-board the space station to ensure that crew safety and the
mission will not be endangered because a needed spare is not available. An
inventory control system should also be provided for all spares to permit
rapid acquisition of a spare vy yr it is required.
0
0
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C
HAZARD GROUP: General
	 NO. 12.57
TITLE: SCS Component Commonality
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONrd: Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Stability and control system components in the space station should have as
much commonality as practicable with components used in the logistics vehicles,
Earth-return vehicles, and independent modules.
REFERE NCES :
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of loss of
attitude control.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 9D.
REMAR KS
Stability and control system equipment will be required on all vehicles used to
transport men and supplies between the Earth and space stations, and independent'
controlled modules. Whenever the same equipment can be used in more than one
vehicle, a built-in emergency or backup spares source will be available to
each vehicle. Trade studies will be required to determine which equipment
could effectively be common t^, more than one vehicle.
C
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HAZARD GROUP: 
General	 NO - 12.58
TITLE: Survival Device Availability
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Universally sized, minimum time to don or place,, survival devices -should be
made available to the crew.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6,
 Supporting Analyses ,  Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Analysis."
REMARKS:
The intent of this guideline is to provide a means by which crew members can
survive when the compartment environment becomes uninhabitable. The device
should give crew members time in which to evacuate the compartment, correct
the emergency situation or take other action as appropriate.
0
0
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C'
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO • 12.59
TITLE: Switch Design and Locatior.
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/F`UNCTIONSr An
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
All switches sliould be designed and loc
inadvertent activation or improper sele
REFERENCES:
1. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC C
and 197.
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis,
REMARKS:
Such features as switchguards, lockwire
considered in the switch design to mini
location on the panel should take into
similarity, quadrant location of operat
to human engineering design practices w
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO • 12.60
TITLE: Timing Equipment Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Communications and Data Management (CDM)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The central timing unit and equipment associated with keeping it up-to-date
should have redundancy provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CDM), for potential hazard of loss of
time reference.
2. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Proposition 10F.
REMARKS:
A central timing unit furnishes essential time information to all on-board
equipment which is dependent upon accurate time signals for its operation; e.g.,
computer functions and a.c. power regulation. Since some of the time-referenced
equipment could affect crew safety if it did not operate satisfactorily,
redundancy should be provided for the central timing function and the equipment
necessary to keep the timing function up-to-date.
O
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r- HAZARD GROUP: General	 NO- 12.61
TITLE: Traffic Flag in work Areas
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Traffic flow other than that necessary to complete the work objective should
be held to a minimum through areas with work in progress.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Analysis,"
Paragraph 2.2.
REMARKS:
The intent of this.guideline is to protect the worker from distraction, and
to protect the other crew members in the event of a work-associated hazard.
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t1HAZARD GROUP: 	 General
	
NO - 12.62
TITLE:	 Traffic Routes
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr Structures/Mechanical Systems
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Traffic routes should " configured in such a manner that traffic congestion
is minimized during emergency conditions.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Analysis,"
Paragraph 4.3.
FS:
tent of this guideline is to reduce escape time to a haven by minimizing
c congestion. It is assumed that the conditions involved are such that
minimizing traffic congestion will significantly reduce the escape time to a
haven; further, that reducing escape time to a haven will increase the prob-
ability of crew survival. If escape routes are lengthy, such as tunnels or
passages, consideration should be given to making them of a size such as to
permit two-way traffic or traffic direction reversal.
L	 i
D
0
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HAZARD GROUP:
	 General NO-	 12.63
TITLE:	 Voice Communications with Command and Control Center(s)
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSt
	 Communications snd Data Management
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Upon entrance to an unoccupied compartment, logistic vehicle or free-flying
laboratory, for purposes requiring more than momentary occupancy, the crew
should immediately establish two-way communications with the command and
control center(s).
REFERENCES:
1.	 D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Paragraph 3.1.4, "Crew Transfer."
REMARKS:
The intent of this.guideline is to verify operability of the Communications
Subsystem in the visited compartment or module, and to contribute to control
center cognizance of total crew disposition and dispersion. This guideline
could be implemented by incorporating it as part of the subsystems periodic
check-out procedure.
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4.0 CROSS INDEXES
4.1
	 CROSS INDEX BY HAZARD GROUPS
The guidelines which are prime to a hazard group are filed numerically
under that group and are listed here in the same sequence. It will be
noticed that the serial numbers correspond with alphabetical placement of
the first words of their titles. Following the list of prime guidelines
in each group is a cross-reference, in numerical sequence, to all other
guidelines filed elsewhere which are applicable to the hazard group.
0
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4.1.1
	
CCUTAMINATION
PRDM
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
1.23
1.2-11.
1.25
1.26
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.30
1.31
1.32
Airflo,: Cutoff to Enclosed Contamination Sources
Battery Venting
Contaminant and Waste Products Collection
Contaminant Control Equipment Redundancy
Control Procedures for Excessive Contamination
CO2 Partial Pressure Monitor
CO2 Removal Equipment
Equipment Contamination by Pmpel.lants
Fluid/Debris Collection and/or Containment
Fluid Leak Isolation
Fluid Lines Contamination
Food Storage Container Redundancy
Food Storage Sterilization
Food Supplies Refrigeration System Redundancy
Hazardous Materials--Quantities
Human Tolerance to Atmosphere Contaminants, Long-Term
Insect Control
Material-Configuration Control
Mercury Metal
Ozone
Plumbing Connectors--Minimum boss
Plumbing Connectors--Minimum Quantity
Toxic or Flammable Fluids
Warning System--Contaminants Detection and Alarm
Warning System--Fluid Systems Contamination
Warning System--Hazardous Materials
Warning System--Relative Humidity
Waste Byproducts Control
Water Contamination
Water Sterilization
Water Storage Isolation
Water Supply Location
3.9
3.22
3.25
6.1
6.5
6.9
6.11
7.5
7.8
ALSO APPLICABLE
Hatchway Airlocks
Venting of Pressure Relief Devices
Warning Systems, Fail-Safe
Electrical Ignition
Pressure Subsystem Interconnection
Pressure Tank Relief Protection Redundancy
Protection of Pressure Vessels
Burns, Chemical and Thermal
Crew Restrictions During Inte:tmal hazardous Operations
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7.10
	 Death of Experimental Plants and Animals
7.13	 Hazardous Materials Accessibility
7.16
	
Medical 1hergencies
8.7	 Emergency Life Support Provisions
8.10	 Interlocks for Equipment with Critical Operating Ranges
8.i4	 Oxygen Storage Tanks Redundancy
8.20
	 Pressure Suit/PLSS CO2 Monitor
8.31
	 Water Contamination Control Procedures
8.32
	 Water Sterilization Equipment Redundancy
8.33	 Water Storage Tanks Redundancy
9.2	 Disposal of Radioactive Material
9.19	 Radioactive Stores
10.1	 CO2 Control Equipment Maintenance
10.3	 Containment of Fire
10.4	 Cryogenics
10.8	 Fire-Resistant Electrical Insulation
10.13 Hypergolic and Pyrophoric Material
10.14 Ignition Source Control
10.19 Over-current Protection
10.21 Propellant Supply System. Location
10.23 Self-Propagation of Fires
10.24 Slow Opening High Pressure Oxygen Valves
O
0
0
0
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4.1.2 DEBRIS AND METEOROID IMPACT
PRIME
	
2.1
	
Component Design for Meteoroid Impact Protection
	
2.2	 Flight Path Orbit Se.ection
	
2.3	 Insulation Material
	
2.4	 Window Replacement
ALSO APPLICABLE
	
3.5
	
Hatch Closure
	
3.17	 Primary Structure Inspection and Repair
	
5.9
	
Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equip ient
	
6.7	 Pressure Systems Location
	
6.10	 Propellant Tank Protection
	
7.17	 Protective Clothing
c
C?
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4.1.3 
3.1 
3·2 
3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
3.6 
3.7 
3.8 
3·9 
3.10 
3.11 
3.12 
3.13 
3,,14 
3.15 
3.16 
3.17 
3.18 
3.19 
3.20 
3.21 
3.22 
3.23 
.3.24 
3.25 
1.5 
4.3 
5.2 
5.12 
6.5 
6.11 
7.8 
7.16 
8.2 
8.5 
8.7 
8.8 
8.17 
8.18 
8.21 
8.30 
02-113070-5 
DECOMP.RESSION/OVERP.RESS~RE 
PRIME 
Compartment Integrity 
Crack Propagation in Prtruary Structure 
Equipment Design for Rapid Decompression 
Hatch Automatic Closure 
Hatch Closure 
Hatch Positive Closure 
Hatch Pressure r..oading 
Hatch Seal Leakage Rate 
Hatchway Airlocks 
Leakage Re~air 8,ystem 
Medical Equipment for Emergencies 
Fressure Regulator Failure 
Pr~s~ure Relief for Trapped Fluids 
Pressure System Depressurization 
Pressurizable Volume Relief Protection 
Pressurized Gas Flow Restriction 
Primary Structure Inspection and Repair 
Rapid Decompression Effects 
Spacecraft Structural Strength 
Vented Component Replacement 
Venting of cabin Pressure 
Venting of Pressure Relief Devices 
Venting Provisions 
Warning Systems, Cabin Pressure 
Warning 8,ystems, Fail-Safe 
ALSO APPLICABLE 
Control Procedures for Excessive Contamin~tion 
Potential Difference, DockingSpacecratt 
Crew Restrictions During DOCking 
Rotating Machinery Shielding 
Pressure Sub$ystem Interconnection 
Protection of Pressure Vessels 
Crew Restrictions During Internal Hazardous Operations 
Medical Emergencies 
Airlock OXygen Monitor 
Continuous Control of cabi~ Pressure 
Emergency Life Support ?rovisions 
Emergency Pressurization Oxygen Supply 
Pressure Leak Detection 
Pressure Relief Valve Repair Procedures 
Pressure Suit/PISS OXygen Usage 
Warning System--OlI\Ygen Pressure 
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4.1.4	 ELECTRICAL
PRIME
	 P
	
4.1
	 Cable Insulation Damage
	
4.2
	 Connector Mismating
	
4.3	 Electrical Arcing
	
4.4	 Electrical Connections
	
4.5	 Electrical Cable Shorts
	
4.6	 Electrical Connector Checks
	
4.7	 Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
	
4.8	 Potential Differences--Docking Spacecraft
	
4.9	 Power Distribution Paths Redundancy
	
4.10	 Power Source Monitors
	
4.11	 Power Sources Redundancy
	
4.12	 Protective Covers for Electrical Equipment
	
4.13	 Redundant Circuits
	
4.14	 Routing of Power Distribution Lines
ALSO APPLICABLE
6.16.7
7.5
10.5
10.6
1o.8
10.19
Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
Electrical Ignition
Pressure Systems L-cation
Burns, Chemical and Thermal
Electrical Power Source Cooling
Electrical Power System Location
Fire Resistant Electrical Insulation
Over-current Protection
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4.1.5	 EQUIPMENT IMPACT
PRIME
5.1,	 Bulk Cargo Restraint
5.2	 Crew Restrictions During Docking
5.3	 Docking Closure Rate Control
5.4	 Docking Light Redundancy
5.5	 Docking Port Redundancy
5.6	 Equipment Operation During EVA
5.7	 Exterior Equipment Design and Location
5.8	 Injury or Damage From Spacecraft Equipment
5.9
	
Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
5.10
	
Mobility Aids, Zero Gravity
5.11	 Pressure'Suit Repair
5.12	 Rotating Machinery Shielding
ALSO APPLICABLE
1.23	 Toxic or Flammable Fluid
2.4	 Window Replacement
3 . 5	 Hatch Closure
3.17	 Primary Structure Inspection and Repair
6.10
	
Propellant Tank Protection
7.4	 Bodily Injuries; Cuts, Contusions, Fractures, Sprains, etc.
7.16
	
Medical Emergencies
10.28 Thruster Location
- 327 -
«..ms--Naw« .. ^ ,•;rs •
	. ::. _	 >Nr^	 ?"atP'N^i, w,. v:.^^+:w,:aw+,'.a.+. 	 _
^^^^c^'^19 ,^L^81:I^ClI^•.i^10?- Fi1J^AE^^
D2-113070-5
0
1 4.1.6
	
EXPLOSION
PRIME
	6.1	 Electrical Ignition
	
6.2	 Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment
	
6.3	 Flammable/Explosive Material Exterior to Spacecraft
	
6.4	 Hazardous Mixtures
	
6.5	 Pressure Subsystem Interconnection
	
6.6	 Pressure System Dynamics
	
6.7	 Pressure Systems Location
	
6.8	 Pressure System Safing
	
6.9	 Pressure Tank Relief Protection Redundancy
	
6.10
	
Propellant Tank Protection
	
6.11	 Protection of Pressure Vessels
	
6.12	 Shrouding and Shielding of Pressure Lines
	
6.13	 Water Electrolysis Unit Cell Reversed Polarity
ALSO APPLICABLE
1.10 Fluid Leak Isolation
Ar 1.21 Plumbing Connectors- -Minimum Loss
1.22 Plumbing Connectors- -Minimum Quantity
1.23 Toxic or Flammable Fluids
1.24 Warning Systems--Contaminants Detection and Alarm
1.26 Warning Systems--Hazardous Materials
3 . 5 Hatch Closure
3.9 Hatchway Airlocks
3.15 Pressurizable Volume Relief Protectors
3.17 Primary Structure Inspection and Repair
4.2 Connector Mismating
4.3 Electrical Arcing
4.4 Electrical Connections
4.6 Electrical Connector Checks
• 4.7 Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
4.8 Potential Difference- -Docking Spacecraft
4.9 Protective Covers for Electrical Equipment
5.9 Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
7.17 Protective Clothing
8.14 Oxygen Storage Tanks Redundancy
10.5 Electrical Power Source Cooling
10.6 Electrical Power System Location
10.11 Eeating Element Flame Suppression
10.13 Hrpergolic and Pyrophoric Material
10.14 Ignition Source Control
10.19 Over-current Protection
10.21
10.23
Propellant Supply System Location
Self-propagation of Fire
10.30 Thruster Temperature Monitor
11.12 Propellant Storage Tanks Redundancy
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4.1.7	 ILLNESS AND INJURY
PRIM
7.1	 Angular Velocity Upper Limit
7.2	 Artificial-Gravity Limits
7.3	 Bacteriological Monitoring of the Crew
7.4	 Bodily Injuries: Cuts, Contusions, Fractures, Sprains ,  etc.
7.5	 Burns., Chemical and 'Dermal
7.6	 Communicable Disease Control
7.7	 Compartment Orientation within Artificial-Gravity Environment
7.8	 Crew Restrictions During Internal Hazardous Operations
7.9	 Death of Crew members
7.10
	 Death of Experimental Plants and Animals
7. 11	 Emotional Disturbances
7.12	 Gastrointestinal and Urinary Tract Disorders
7.13	 Hazardous Materials Accessibility
7.14	 Health and Safety Officer(s) Training
7.15	 Irrational Crew Member Restraint
7.16	 Medical Emergencies
7.17	 Protective Clothing
7.18	 Quarantine Regulations
7.19	 Radial Traffic in Artificial-Gravity Environment
7.20
	 Radiation Casualty Evacuation
7.21
	 Rotation Radius Lower Limit
7.22	 Sanitation Standards
7.23	 Work Station Position for Artificial-Gravity Station
ALSO APPLICABLE
1.3-2	 Food Storage Containers Redundancy
1.13	 Food Storage Sterilization
1.14	 Food Supplies Refrigeration System Redundancy
1.27 Warning System--Relative Humidity
1.28	 Waste By-products Control
1.29	 Water Contamination
1.30
	 Water Sterilization
1.31	 Water Storage Isolation
1.32	 Water Supply Location
3.9
	
Hatchway Airlocks
3.11	 Medical Equipment for Emergencies
4.3	 Electrical Arcing
5.8	 Injury or Damage From Spacecraft Equipment
5.10	 Mobility Aids, Zero Gravity
8.19	 Pressure Suit/PISS Atmosphere Composition
10.4	 Cryogenics
r^
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G	 4.1.8	 LOSS OF VITAL SUPPLIES
PRIM
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
8.8
8.9
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
8.15
8.16
8.17
8.18
8.19
8.20
8.21
8.22
8.23
8.24
8.25
8.26
8.27
8.28
8.29
8.30
8.31
8.32
8.33
Air Circulation
Airlock Oxygen Monitor
Airlock Suit Loop Connectors
Autonomous Operation of Suit Loop
Continuous Control of Cabin Pressure
Crew Shower Failure Protection
Emergency Life Support Provisions
Emergency Pressurization Oxygen Supply
Environmental Control/Life Support System Redundancy
Interlocks for Equipment with Critical Operating Ranges
Oxygen Leak Isolation
Oxygen Quantity and Usage
Oxygen Regulation Component Redundancy
Oxygen Storage Tanks Redundancy
Oxygen Usage Manual Control
PISS Emergency Backup
Pressure Leek Detectors
Pressure Relief Valve Repair Procedures
Pressure Suit/PISS Atmosphere Composition
Pressure Suit/PLSS CO2 Monitor
Pressure Suit/PISS Oxygen Usage
Pressure Suit/PT^SS Redundancy
Pressure Suit Temperature and Humidity Monitoring
Suit Loop Check-out
Suit Loop Components Maintenance
Suit Loop Component Redundancy
Suit Loop Manual Control
Suit Loop Outlet
Suit Loop Pressure Monitor
Warning System--Oxygen Pressure
Water Contamination Control Procedures
Water Sterilization Equipment Redundancy
Water Storage Tanks Redundancy
ALSO APPLICABLE
Airflow Cutoff to Enclosed Contamination Sources
Food Storage Containers Redundancy
Food Storage Sterilization
Food Supplies Refrigeration
Warning System- -Contaminants
Water Contamination
Water Sterilization
Water Storage Isolatim
Water Supply Location
Water Electrolysis Unit Cell
Sloan Opening High Pressure Oxygen Valves
System Redundancy
Detection and Alarm
Reversed Polarity
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4.1.9 RADIATION
PRIME
9.1 Controlled Access and Use of Radiation Sources
9.2 Disposal of Radioactive Material
9.3 Handling and Use of Radioactive Material
9.4 Microwave and X-radiation Hazard
9.5 Nuclear Power Radiation Protection
9.6 Nuclear Power Unit Radiation Protection
9.7 Nuclear Reactor Safety
9.8 Orbital Path Radiation Environment
9.9 Placement of Equipment and Stores
9.10 Protection Against Nuclear Explosion Radiation
9.11 Radiation Detectors Location and Characteristics
9.12 Radiation Effects upon Spacecraft Materials
9.13 Radiation Environment Restrictions on EVA
9.14 Radiation Exposure and Control Program
9.15 Radiation Exposure Record
9.16 Radiation Haven
9.17 Radiation Monitoring
9.18 Radiation Protection During EVA
9.19 Radioactive Stores
9.20 Spacecraft Radiation Shielding
9.21 Selection of Materials for Use in Radiation Environment
ALSO APPLICABLE
	3.25	 Warning Systems, Fail-Safe
	
7.8	 Crew Restrictions During Interna l. Hazardous Operations
	
7.20
	 Radiation Casualty Evacuation
0.
O
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4.1.10
	
TEMPERATURE EXTREMES
PRIME
10.1	 CO2 Control Equipment Maintenance
10.2	 Combustible Waste Materials
10.3	 Containment of Fire
10.4	 Cryogenics
10.5	 Electrical Power eource Cooling
10.6	 Electrical Power System Location
10.7	 Fire Control
10.8	 Fire Resistant Electrical Insulation
10.9	 Fire Retardant Electrical Equipment
10.10 Freezing of Fluid Lines
10.11 Heating Element Flame Suppression
10.12 Heat Monitoring in Operating Equipment
10.13 Hypergolic and Pyrophoric Material
10.14 Ignition Source Control
10.15 Isolation of Oxygen Source
10.16 Location of Combustibles
10.17 Lubricants
10.18 Manual Control of Temperature Control Systems
10.19 Over-current Protection
10.20 Personnel Protection for Heated Surfaces
10.21 Propellant Supply System Location
10.22 Protection of Temperature Critical Equipment
10.23 Self-propagation of Fires
10.24 Slog Opening High Pressure Oxygen Valves
10.25 Spacecraft Thermal Protection
10.26 Thermal Control Equipment Redundancy
10.27 Thermal Control Temperature Sensors
ALSO APPLICABLE
1.5	 Control Procedures for Excessive Contamination
1.10	 Fluid Leak Isolation
1.21	 Plumbing Connectors, Minimum Loss
1.22	 Plumbing Connectors, Minimum Quantity
1.23	 Toxic or Flammable Fluids
1.26
	
Warning System- -Hazardous Materials
2.3	 Insulating Material
3.5	 Hatch Closure
3.9	 Hatchway Airlocks
3.15	 Pressurizable Volume Relief Protection
3.25	 Warning Systems, Fail-Safe
4.1
	 Cable Insulation Damage
4.2	 Connector Mismating
4.3	 Electrical. Arcing
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4.4
	 Electrical Connections
	
4.5	 Electrical Cable Shorts
	
4.6	 Electrical Connector Checks
	
4.7	 Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
	
4.8
	 Potential Difference--Docking Spacecraft
	
4.9	 Protective Covers for Electrical Equipment
	
5.9
	
Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
	
5.12	 Rotating Machinery Shielding
	
6.7	 Pressure Systems Location
	
7.5	 Burns., Chemical and Thermal
	
7.8	 Crew Restrictions During Internal Hazardous Operations
	
7.16	 Medical Emergencies
	
7.17	 Protective Clothing
	
8.7	 Emergency Life Support Provisions
10.28 TPruster Location
10.29 T'..iruster Operation During EVA
10.30 `Thruster Temperature Monitor
O
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4.1.11
	 SPACECRAFT ACCELERATIONS
PRIME
11.1 Angular Rate Monitor
11.2 Automatic Tumbling Correction
11.3 Component Redundancy
11.4 Component Replacement for CMG's
11.5 Crew Restrictions During Space Station Spin-up
11.6 Damage-Induced Motion
11.7 Manual/Automatic Control Interlocks
11.8 Manual Control of SCS Thrusters
11.9 On-board Crew Complement During Space Base Spin-up
11.10 Propellant Flow Shut-off Redundancy
11.11 Torques from Venting
11.12 Propellant Storage Tanks Redundancy
ALSO APPLICABLE
	
5.3	 Docking Closure Rate Control
	
5.9
	
Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
	
6.1	 Electrical Ignition
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4.1.12 GENERAL
PRIME
12.1 Accessways
12.2 Airlock Hatch Operation
12.3 Airlock Pressurization Redundancy
12.4 Airlock Redundancy
12.5 Alternate Command and Control Center
' 12.6 Assistance to Injured Personnel
12.7 Attitude Indication Redundancy
12.8 Authority to Proceed with Hazardou3 and Certain Other Operations
" 12.9 Cargo Transfer Equipment Redundancy
12.10 Closed Circuit Television Monitoring
12.11 Command Personnel Location Restrictions
12.12 Communication Equipment Commonality
12.13 Compartmentation
12.14 Compartment Environmental Status
12.15 Computer Equipment Redundancy
12.16 Continuous Attitude Indication
12.17 Crew Activity Restrictions
12.18 Crew Distribution
12.19 Crew Movement
12.20 Crew-oriented Areas
12.21 Crew Performance of Complex Tasks
12.22 Critical Caution and Warning Aleams
12.23 Docking Mechanism Redundancy
12.24 Emergency Cosmmunications System
12.25 Emergency Crew Evacuation
12.26 Emergency EVA Communications
12.27 Emergency Lighting for EVA
12.28 Emergency Procedures and Training
12.29 Emergency Procedures (Fire)
12.30 Escape Routes
12.31 EVA Emergency Procedures
12.32 External Communications Redundancy
12.33 Fire Alarm
12.34 Fluid Quantity Usage Monitor
12 .35 Hazardous Resupply Operations Monitoring
12.36 Health and Safety Officer
' 12.37' Incoming Vehicle Emergency
12.38 Independent Emergency Parer Source
12 .39 Initial Mannin g of Space Station/Base
12.40 Inoperative Sensing Systems
12.41 Intercom Station Monitor
12.42 Intercom System
12.43 Lighting
12.44 Location of Intercom Stations
12.45 Maintenance Capability
")	 12.46 Minimizing EVA Requirements
341 -
D2-113070-5
12.47 Monitoring of Docker'. Vehicles
12.48 Monitoring of EVA/NA
12.49 Periodic Com=ication Subsystem Check
12.50 Premature Subsystem Arming or Delayed Disarming
12.51 Pressurized Free Volume
12.52 Propellant Leak Detection
12.53 Propellant Quantity and Usage
12.54 Qualitative and Quantitative personnel Requirements
12.55 Replacement Component Installation
12.56 Replacement Component Provisioning
12.57 SCS Component Commonality
12.58 Survival Device Availability	 -
12•59 Switch Design and Location
12.60 Timing Equipment Redundancy
12.61 Traffic Flow in Work Areas
12.62 Traffic Routes
12.63 Voice Commnaaication with Command and Control Center(s)
ALSO APPLICABLE
Does not apply.
.
0
- 342 -
D2-113070-5
CROSS INDEX BY SUBSYSTEMS
The guidelines applicable tc a given subsystem are referenced in numerical
order in this section. The subsystems are arranged alphabetically for
convenience. A category entitled "Operations" has been included to pick
up guidelines which are more oriented toward procedures than to hardware.
It is apparent that many guidelines pertain to more than one subsystem and,
therefore are duplicated between subsystem listings. The following subsys-
tem categories have been used:
•	 4.2.1 Communications and Data Management (CDM)
4.2.2 Crew System (CS)
4.2.3 Electrical Power System (EPS)
4.2.4 Environmental. Control/Life Support System (EC/LSS)
4.2.5 Experiments (EX)
4.2.6 Operations (OP)
4.2.7 Stability and Control System (SCS)
4.2.8 Structures/Mechanical Systems (S/M)
C
4.2
O
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4.2.1	 COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA MANAGEMENT
1.18	 Materials--Configuration Control
1.19	 Mercury Metal
2.1
	
Component Design for Meteoroid Impact Protection
3 . 3	 Equipment Design for Rapid Decompression
3.14	 Pressure System Depressurization
4.1	 Cable Insulation Damage
4.2	 Connector Mismating
4.3	 Electrical Arcing
4.5	 Electrical Cable Shorts
4.6	 Electrical Connector Checks
4.7	 Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
4.9	 Power Distribution Paths Redundancy
4.12	 Protective Covers for Electrical Equipment
5.6	 Equipment Operation During EVA
5.7	 Exterior Equipment Design and Location
5.8	 Injury or Damage from Spacecraft Equipment
5.9	 Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
6.1
	
Electrical Ignition
6.2	 Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment
6.3
	
Flammable/Explosive Material Exterior to Spacecraft
6.5	 Pressure Subsystem Interconnection
7.4	 Bodily Injuries: Cuts, Contusions, Fractures, Sprains, etc.
7.5	 Burns, Chemical and Thermal
7.13	 Hazardous Materials Accessibility
9 . 9	 Placement of Equipment and Stores
9.10
	
Radiation Detectors Location and Characteristics
9.12	 Radiation Effects upon Spacecraft Materials
9.21
	
Selection of Materials for Use in Radiation Environment
10.4	 Cryogenics
10.7	 Fire Control
10.8	 Fire Resistant Electrical Insulation
10.9	 Fire Retardant Electrical Equipment
10.10 Freezing of Fluid Lines
10.17 Lubricants
10.19 Over-current Protection
10.20 Personnel Protection for Heated Surfaces
10.23 Self-propagation of Fires
10.28 Thruster Location
x.
c^
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12.10 Closed Circuit Television Monitoring
12.12 Communications Equipment Commonality
12.13 Compartmentation
12.14 Compartment Environmental Status
12.15 Computer Equipment Redundancy
12.22 Critical Caution and Warning Alarms
12.24 Emergency Communication System
12.26 Emergency EVA Communications
12.32 External Communications Redundancy
12.33 Fire Alarm
12 .35 Hazardous Resupply Operations Monitoring
12.40 Inoperative Sensing Systems
12.41 Intercom Station Monitor
12.42 Intercom System
12.43 Lighting
12.44 Location of Intercoms Stations
12.45 Mainteancne Capability
12.46 Minimizing EVA Requirements
12.47 Monitoring of Docked Vehicles
12.49 Periodic Communications Subsystem Check
12.50 Premature Subsystem Arming or Delayed Disarming
1.2.55 Replacement Component Installation
12.56 Replacement Component Provisioning
12.59 Svitch Design and Location
12.60 Timing Equipment Redundancy
12.62 Voice Communications with Command and Control Centers O
0
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	4.2.2	 CREW SYSTEM (CM)
1.9	 Fluid/Debris Collection and,/or Containment
1.12
1.13
1.141. ].5
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.22
1.24
1.25
1.28
1.29
1.30
1.31
1.32
2.1
Food Storage Container Redundancy
Food Storage Sterilization
Food Supplies Refrigeration System Redundancy
Hazardous Materials, Quantities
Insect Control
Materials- -Configuration Control
Mercury Metal
Ozone
Plumbing Connectors- -Minimum Quantity
Warning System Contaminants Detection and Alarm
Warning System- -Fluid Systems Contamination
Waste By-products Control
Water Contamination
Water Sterilization
Water Storage Isolation
Water Supply Location
Component Design for Meteoroid Impact Protection
	
3.3	 Equipment Design for Rapid Decompression
	
3.10
	 Leakage Repair System
	
3.11	 Medical Equipment for Emergencies
	
3.12	 Pressure Regulator Failure
	
3.14	 Pressure System Depressurization
	
3.18	 Rapid Decompression Effects
	
4.5	 Electrical Cable Shorts
	
4.7	 Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
	
4.9	 Power Distribution Paths Redundancy
	
4.13	 Redundant Circuits
	
5.6	 Equipment Operation During EVA
	
5.7	 Exterior Equipment Design and Location
	
5.8	 Injury or Damage from Spacecraft Equipment
	
5.10	 Mobility Aids, Zero-Gravity
	
5.11	 Pressure Suit Repair
	
6.2	 Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment
	
6.3	 Flammable/Explosive Material Exterior to Spacecraft
	
6.4	 Hazardous Mixtures
	
6. 5 	 Pressure Subsystem Interconnection
	
6.6	 Pressure System Dynamics
	
6.8	 Pressure System Safing
	
7.3	 Bacteriological Monitoring of the Crew,
	
7.4	 Bodily Injuries: Cuts, Contusions, Fractures, Sprains, etc.
	
7.5
	
Burns, Chemical and Thermal
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7.6	 Communicable Disease Control
7.9	 Death of Crew Members
7.10	 Death of Experimental Plants and Animals
7.11	 Emotional Disturbances
7.12	 Gastrointestinal and Urinary Tract Disorders
7.13	 Hazardous Materials Accessibility
7.14	 Health and Safety Officer(s) Training
7.15	 Irrational Crew Member Restraint
7.16	 Medical Emergencies
7.17	 Protective Clothing
7.18	 Quarantine Regulations
7.20
	
Radiation Casualty Evacuation
7.22
	 Sanitation Standards
8.3	 Airlock Suit Loop Connections
8.6
	 Crew Shower Failure Protection
8.7	 Emergency Life Support Provisions
8.16
	 PISS Emergency Backup
8.19	 Pressure Suit/PLSS Atmosphere Composition
8.20
	 Pressure Suit/PLSS CO2 Monitor
8.21
	 Pressure Suit/PLSS Oxygen Usage
8.22
	 Pressure Suit/PLSS Redundancy
8.23	 Pressure Suit Temperature and Humidity Monitoring
8.31
	 Water Contamination Control Procedures
8.32
	 Water Sterilization Equipment Redundancy
8.33	 Water Storage Tanks Redundancy
9 . 3	 Handling and Use of Radioactive Material
9 . 9	 Placement of Equipment and Stores
9.10
	 Protection Against Nuclear Explosion Radiation
9.11	 Radiation Detection Location and Characteristics
9.12	 Radiation Effects upon Spacecraft Materials
9.15	 Radiation Exposure Record
9.16	 radiation Haven
9.17	 Radiation Monitoring
9.19	 Radioactive Stores
9.21
	 Selection of Materials for Use in Radiation Environment
10.4	 Cryogenics
10.7	 Fire Control
10.9	 hire Retardant Electrical Equipment
10.10 Freezing of Fluid Lines
10.17 Lubricants
10.20 Personnel Protection for Heated Surfaces
10.22 Protection of Temperature Critical Equipment
10.23 Self-Propagation of Fire
10.27 Thermal Control Temperature Sensors
10.29 Thruster Operation During EVA
0
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12.13
12.15
12.21
12.22
12.26
12.27
12.31
12.33
12.36
12.40
12.43
12.45
12.46
12.48
12.50
12.51
12.54
12.55
12.56
12.58
12.59
Compartmentation
Computer Equipment Redundancy
Crew Performance of Complex Tasks
Critical Caution and Warning Alarms
Emergency EVA Communications
Emergency Lighting for EVA
EVA Emergency Procedures
Fire Alarm
Health and Safety Officer
Inoperative Sensing Systems
Lighting
Maintenance Capability
Minimizing EVA Requirements
Monitoring of EVA/IVA
Premature Subsystem Arming or Delayed Disarming
Pressurized Free Volume
Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements
Replacement Component Installation
Replacement Component Provisioning
Survival Device Availability
Switch Design and Location
O
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4.2.3	 ELECMICAL PCIWER SYSTEM (FM)
	
1.2	 Battery Venting
	
1.8	 Equipment Contamination by Propellants
	
1.18	 Materials--Configuration Control
	
1.19	 Mercury Metal
	
1.20
	
Ozone
	
1.22
	 Plumbing Connectors--Minimum Quantity
	
1.23	 Toxic or Flammable Fluids
	
2.2
	 Component Design for Meteoroid Impact Protection
	
3.3	 Equipment Design for Rapid Decompression
	
3.14	 Pressure System Depressurization
	
3.21
	 Venting of Cabin Pressure
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.9
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.13
4.14
Cable Insulation Damage
Connector Mismating
Electrical Arcing
Electrical Connections
Electrical Cable Shorts
Electrical Connector Checks
Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
Paver Distribution Paths Redundancy
Power Source Monitors
Paver Sources Redundancy
Protective Covers for Electrical Equipment
Redundant Circuits
Routing of Power Distribution Lines
	
5.6	 Equipment Operations During EVA
	
4.7	 Exterior Equipment Design and Location
	
5.8	 Injury or Damage from Spacecraft Equipment
	
5.9
	
Mecbmical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
	
5.12	 Rotating Machinery Shielding
	
6.1	 Electrical Ignition
	
6.2	 Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment
	
6.3
	
Flammable/Explosive Material Exterior to Spacecraft
	
6.5	 Pressure Subsystem Interconnection
	
6.6	 Pressure System Dynamics
	
6.8	 Pressure System Safing
7.4
7.5
7.13
9.2
9.5
9.6
Bodily Injuries: Cuts, Contusions, Fractures, Sprains, etc.
Burns, Chemical and Thermal
Hazardous Materials Accessibility
Disposal of Radioactive Material
Nuclear Poorer Radiation Protection
Nuclear Foyer Unit Radiation Protection
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9.7	 Nuclear Reactor Safety
9 . 9	 Placement of Equipment and Stores
9.12	 Radiation Effects upon Spacecraft Materials
9.16	 Radiation Haven
9.18	 Radiation Protection During EVA
9.21	 Selection of Materials for Use in Radiation Environment
10.4	 Cryogenics
10.5	 Electrical Power Source Cooling
10.6	 Electrical Power System Location
10.7	 Fire Control
10.8	 Fire Resistant Electrical Insulation
10.9	 Fire Retardant Electrical Equipment
10.10 Freezing of Fluid Lines
10.11 Heating Element Flame Suppression
10.12 Heat Monitoring in Operating Equipment
10.14 Ignition Source Control
10.17 Lubricants
10.19 Over-current Protection
10.20 Personnel Protection for Heated Surfaces
10.22 Protection of Temperature Critical Equipment
10.23 Self-Propagation of Fire
10.27 Thermal Control Temperature Sensors
10.28 Thruster Location
12.13 Compartmentation
12.15 Computer Equipment Redundancy
12,33 Fire Alarm
12.38 Independent Emergency Power Source
12.40 Inoperative Sensing System
12.43 Lighting
12.45 Maintenance Capability
12.46 Minimizing EVA requirements
12.50 . Premature Subsystem Arming or Delayed Disarming
12.55 Replacement Component Installation
12.56 Replacement Component P=rovisioning
12.59 Switch Design and Location
0
0
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4.2.4	 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL i/LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM (EC/LSS )
Airflow Cutoff to Enclosed Contamination Sources
Contaminant and Waste Products Collection
Contaminant Control Equipment Redundancy
Control Procedures for Excessive Contamination
CO2 Partial Pressure Monitor
CO2 Removal Equipment
Fluid/Debris Collection and/or Containment
Fluid Leak Isolation
Fluid Lines Contamination
Food Storage Container Redundancy
Food Storage Sterilization
Food Supplies Refrigeration System Redundancy
Human Tolerance to Atmosphere Contaminants, Long-term
Materials--Configuration Control
Mercury Metal
Plumbing Connectors -Minimum Loss
Plumbing Connectors--Minimum Quantity
Toxic or Flammable Fluids
Warning System--Contaminants Detection and Alarm
Warning System--Fluid Systems Contamination
Warning System--Hazardous Materials
Warning System--Relative Humidity
Waste By-products Control
Water Contamination
Water Sterilization
Water Storage Isolation
Water Supply Location
Component Design for Meteoroid Impact Protection
Equipment Design for Rapid Decompression
Pressure Regulator Failure
Pressure Relief for Trapped Fluids
Pressure System Depressurization
Pressurizable Volume Relief Protection
Pressurized Gas Flow Restriction
Primary Structure Inspection and Repair
Vented Component Replacement
Venting of Cabin Pressure
Venting of Pressure Relief Devices
Venting Provisions
Warning Systems, Cabin Pressure
Warning Systems, Fail-Safe
1.1
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.16
1.18
1.19
1.21
1.22
1.23
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.30
1.31
1.32
2.1
3,34J
3.12
3.13
3.14
3.15
3.16
3.17
3.20
3.21
3.22
3.23
3.24
3.25
	
4.1
	 Cable Insulation Damage
	
4.2
	 Connector Mismating
	
4.3	 Electrical Arcing
	
4.5	 Electrical Cable Shorts
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4.6
	 Electrical Connector Checks
	
4.7	 Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
	
4.9	 Power Distribution Paths Redundancy
	
4.12	 Protective Cover for Electrical Equipment
	
4.13	 Redundant Circuits
	
5.6	 Equipment Operation During EVA
	
5.7	 Exterior Equipment Design and Location
	
5.8	 Injury or Damage from Spacecraft Equipment
	
5 . 9	 Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
	
5.11	 Pressure Suit Repair
	
5.12	 Rotating Machinery Shielding
	
6.1	 Electrical Ignition
	
6.2	 Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment
	
6.3	 Flammable/Explosive Material Exterior to Spacecraft
	
6.4	 Hazardous Mixtures
	
6.5	 Pressure Subsystem Interconnections
	
6.6
	 Pressure System Dynamics
	
6.7	 Pressure Systems Location
	
6.8	 Pressure System Safing
	
6.9	 Pressure Tank Relief Protection Redundancy
	
6.13	 Water Electrolysis Unit Cell Reversed Polarity
	
7.4	 Bodily Injuries: Cuts, Contusions, Fractures .  Sprains, etc.
	
7.5	 Burns, Chemical and Thermal
	
7.6	 Communicable Disease Control
	
7.9	 Death of Crew Members
	
7.12	 Gastrointestinal and Urinary Tract Disorders
	
7.13	 Hazardous Materials Accessibility
	
7.16	 Medical Emergencies
	
7.22	 Sanitation Standards
	
8.1
	 Air Circulation
	
8.4	 Autonomous Operation of Suit Loop
	
8.5	 Continuous Control of Cabin Pressure
	
8.7	 Emergency Life Support Provisions
	
8.8
	 Emergency Pressurization Oxygen Supply
	
8.9	 Environmental Control/Life Support System Redundancy
	
8.10
	 Interlocks for Equipment with Critical Operating Ranges
	
8.11
	 Oxygen Leak Isolation
	
8.12	 Oxygen Quantity and Usage
	
8.13	 Oxygen Regulation Component Redundancy
	
8.14	 Oxygen Storage Tanks Redundancy
	
8.15	 Oxygen Usage Manual Control
	
8.16
	 PLSS Emergency Backup
	
8.17	 Pressure Leak Detection
	
8.18	 Pressure Relief Valve Repair Procedures
	
8.19	 Pressure Suit/PLSS Atmosphere Composition
	
8.20
	 Pressure Suit/PISS CO2 Monitor
0
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8.21
8.22
8.23
8.24
8.25
8.26
8.27
8.28
8.29
8.30
8.31
8.32
8.33
Pressure Suit/PISS Oxygen Usage
Pressure Suit/PLSS Redundancy
.ressure Suit Temperature and Humidity Monitoring
Suit Loop Checkout
Suit Loop Components Maintenance
Suit Loop Component Redundancy
Suit Loop Manual Control
Suit Loop Outlet
Suit Loop Pressure Monitor
Warning System--Oxygen Pressure
Water Contamination Control Procedures
Water Sterilization Equipment Redundancy
Water Storage Tanks Redundancy
9.9
	
Placement of Equipment and Store
9.12	 Radiation Effects upon Spacecraft Materials
9.19	 Radioactive Stores
9.21
	
Selection of Materials for Use it Radiation Environment
10.1
	
CO2 Control Equipment Maintenance
10.3	 Containment of Fire
10.4	 Cryogenics
10.7	 Fire Control
10.8	 Fire Resistant Electrical Insulation
10.9	 Fire Retardant Electrical Equipment
10.10 Freezing of Fluid Lines
10.11 Heating Element Flame Suppression
10.12 Heat Monitoring in Operating Equipment
10.17 Lubricants
10.18 Manual Control of Temperature Control Systems
10.19 Over-current Protection
10.20 Personnel Protection for Heated Surfaces
10.22 Protection of Temperature Critical Equipment
10.23 Self-Propagation of Fires
10.24 Slaw Opening High Pressure Oxygen Valves
10.26 Thermal Control Equipment Redundancy
10.27 Thermal Control Temperature Sensors
12.13
12.15
12.30
12.33
12.34
]2.40
12.43
12.45
12.46
12.48
12.50
12.52
Compartmentation
Computer Equipment Redundancy
Escape Routes
Fire Alarm
Fluid Quantity Usage Monitor
Inoperative Sensing Systems
Lighting
XW.ntenence Capability
Minimizing 
$VA47IVA
irements
Monitoring of 
Premature Subsystem Arming or Delayed Disarming
Propellant Leek Detection
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0—12.55 Replacement Component Installation
12.56 Replacement Component Provisioning
12.58 Survival Device Availability
12.59 Switch Design and Location
O
0
- 356 -
D2-113070 -5
4.2.5	 EXPEREAENTS (EX)
	
1.15	 Hazardous Materials--quantities
	
1.17	 Insect nontrcl
	
1.18	 Materia-L6--Configuration Control
	
1.19	 Mercury Metal
	
1.20	 Ozone
	
2.1	 Component Design for Meteoroid Impact Protection
	
3.3	 Equipment Design for Rapid Decompression
	
3.12	 Pressure Regulator Failure
	
3.13	 Pressure Relief for Trapped Fluids
	
3.14	 Pressure System Depressurization
	
3.21	 Venting of Cabin Pressure
4.1
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.9
4.12
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
Cable Insulation Damage
Electrical Arcing
Electrical Connections
Electrical Cable Shorts
Electrical Connector Checks
Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
Power Distribution Paths Redundancy
Protective Covers for Electrical Equipment
Equipment Operation During EVA
Exterior Equipment Design and Location
Injury or Damage from Spacecraft Equipment
Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
	
6.1	 Electrical Ignition
	
6.2	 Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment
	
6.3	 Flammable/Explosive Material Exterior to Spacecraft
	
6.4	 Hazardous Mixtures
	
6.5	 Pressure Subsystem Interconnection
	
6.6	 Pressure System Dynamics
	
6.8	 Pressure System Safing
	
7.4	 Bodily Injuries: Cuts, Contusions, Fractures, Sprains, etc.
	
7.5	 Burns, Chemical and Thermal
	
7.8	 Crew Restrictions During Internal Hazardous Operations
	
7.10
	
Death of Experimental Plants and Animals
	
7.13	 Hazardous Materials Accessibility
	9.1	 Controlled Access and Use of Radiation Sources
	
9 . 3	 Handling and Use of Radioactive Material
	
9 . 9	 Placement of Equipment and Stores
	
9.12	 Radiation Effects upon Spacecraft Materials
	
9.21
	 Selection of Materials for Use in Radiation Environment
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(7
	10.4	 Cryogenics
	
10.7	 Ftre Control
	
10.8	 Fire Resistant Electrical Insulation
	
10.9	 Fire Retardant Electrical Equipment
10.10 Freezing of Fluid Lines
14.11 Heating Element Flame Suppression
10.12 Heat Monitoring in Operating Equipment
10.13 Hypergolic and Pyrophoric Material
10.17 Lubricants
10.19 Over-current Protection
10.20 Personnel Protection for Heated Surfaces
10.23 Self-propagatiun of Fires
12.10 Closed Circuit Television Monitoring
12.13 Compartmentation
12.14 Compartment Environmental Status
12.15 Computer Equipment Redundancy
12
.33 Fire Alarm
12.40 Inoperative Sensing Systems
12.43 Lighting
12.45 Maintenance Capability
12.46 Minimizing EVA Requirements
12.50 Premature Subsystem Arming or Delayed Disarming
12 .55 Replacement Component Installation
12.56 Replacement Component Provisioning
12.59 Switch Design and Location O
0
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cl
	
4.2.6	 OPERATIONS (OP)
	
1.15	 Hazardous Materials--Quantities
	
1.17	 Insect Control
	
1.18	 Materials--Configuration Control
	
1.19	 Mercury Metal
	
1.27	 Warning System--Relative Humidity
	
2.1
	
Component Design for Meteoroid Impact Protection
	
2.2	 Flight Path Orbit Selection
	
3 . 3	 Equipment Design for Rapid Decompression
	
3.5	 Hatch Closure
	
3 . 9	 Hatchway Airlocks
	
3.14
	
Pressure System Depressurization
	
3.17	 Primary Structure Inspection and Repair
	
4.1
	
Cable Insulation Damage
	
4.4	 Electrical Connections
	
4.5	 Electrical Cable Shorts
	
4.7	 Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
	
4.9	 Power Distribution Paths Redundancy
5.1
5.2
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.10
6.2
6.3
6.5
Bulk Cargo Restraint
Crew Restrictions During Docking
Docking Light Redundancy
Docking Port Redundancy
Equipment Operation During EVA
Exterior Equipment Design and Location
Injury or Damage from Spacecraft Equipment
Mobility Aids, Zero Gravity
Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment
Flammable/Explosive Material Exterior to Spacecraft
Pressure Subsystem Interconnection
7.1	 Angular Velocity Upper Limit
7.2	 Artificial-Gravity Limits
7.3	 Bacteriological Monitoring of the Crew
7.4	 Bodily Injuries: Cuts, Contusions, Fractures, Sprains, etc.
7.5	 Burns, Chemical and Thermal
7.6	 Comm micable Disease Control
7.7	 Compartment Orientation within Artificial-Gravity Environment
7.8	 Crew Restrictions During Internal. Hazardous Operations
7.11	 Emotional Disturbances
7.13	 Hazardous Materials Accessibility
7.14	 Health and Safety Officer(s) Training
7.15	 Irrational Crew Member Restraint
7.16
	
Medical Emergencies
C	 7.18 Quarantine Regulations
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7.19	 Radial Traffic in Artificial-Gravity Environment
7.20
	
Radiation Casualty Evacuation
7.21
	 Rotation Radius Lower Limit
7.22	 Sanitation Standards
7.23	 Work Station Position for Artificial-Gravity Station
8.16
	 PLSS Emergency Backup
8.19	 Pressure Suit/PLSS Atmosphere Composition
9.1	 Controlled Access and Use of Radiation Sources
9.2	 Disposal of Radioactive Material
9 . 3	 idling and Use of Radioactive Material
9.4	 Micro-wave and X-Radiation Hazard
9.6	 Nuclear Power Unit Radiation Protection
9.8	 Orbital Path Radiation Environment
9 . 9	 Placement of Equipment and Stores
9.12	 Radiation Effects upon Spacecraft Materials
9.13	 Radiation Environment Restrictions on EVA
9.14	 Radiation Exposure and Control Program
9.15	 Radiation Exposure Record
9.21
	 Selection of Materials for Use in Radiation Environment
10.2	 Combustible Waste Material
10.4	 Cryogenics
10.7	 Fire Control
10.9	 Fire Retardant Electrical Equipment
10.10 Freezing of Fluid Lines
10.13 $ypergolic and Pyrophoric Materials
10.14 Ignition Source Control
10.16 Location of Combustibles
10.17 Lubricants
10.20 Personnel Protection for Heated Surfaces
10.23 Self-propagating Fires
10.29 Thruster Operation During EVA
11.5	 Crew Restrictions During Space Station Spin-up
11.9	 On-board Crew Complement During Space Base Spin-up
12.5	 Alternate Command and Control Center
12.6	 Assistance to Injured Personnel
12.8	 Authority to Proceed with Hazardous and Certain Other Operations
12.10 Closed Circuit Television Monitoring
12.11 Commend Personnel Location Restrictions
12.13 Compartmentation
12.14 Compartment Environmental Status
12.15 Computer Equipment Redundancy
12.17 Crew Activity Restrictions
12.18 Crew Distribution
12.19 Crew Movement
12.20 Crew-oriented Areas
O
.
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C2
12.21
12.25
12.2y
12.28
12.29
12.30
12.31
12
.33
12.35
12.36
12.37
12.39
12.4o
12.42
12.43
12.45
12.46
12.48
12.49
12.50
12.54
12.55
12.56
12.59
^.	 12.61
Crew Performance of Complex Tasks
Emergency Crew Evacuation
Emergency Lighting for EVA
Emergency Procedures and Training
Emergency Procedures (Fire)
Escape Routes
EVA Emergency Procedures
Fire Alarm
Hazardous Resupply Operations Monitoring
Health and Safety Officer
Incoming Vehicle Emergency
Initial Manning of Space Station/Base
Inoperative Sensing Systems
Intercom System
Lighting
Maintenance Capability
Minimizing EVA Requirements
Monitoring of EVA/IVA
Periodic Communications Subsystem Check
Premature Subsystem Arming or Delayed Disarming
Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements
Replacement Component Installation
Replacement Component Provisioning
Switch Design and Location
Traffic Flow in Work Areas
- 
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4
4.2.7 STABILITY AND CONTROL SYSTEM (SCS)
1.8 Equipment Contamination by Propellants
1.9 Fluid/Debris Collection and/or Containment
1.10 Fluid Leak Isolation
1.11 Fluid Lines Contamination
1.18 Materials--Configuration Control
1.19 Mercury Metal
1.21 Plumbing Connectors--Minimum Loss
• 1.22 Plumbing Connectors--Minimum Quantity
1.23 Toxic or Flammable Fluids
1.24 Warning System--Contaminants Detection and Alarm
• 1.25 Warning Systems--Fluid Systems Contamination
2.1 Component Design for Meteoroid Impact Protection
2.2 Flight Path Orbit Selection
3.3 Equipment Design for Rapid Decompression
3.12 Pressure Regulator Failure
3.13 Pressure Relief for Trapped Fluids
3.14 Pressure System Depressurization
3.15 Pressurizable Volume Relief Protection
3.16 Pressurized Gas Flow Restrictions
3.21 Venting of Cabin Pressure
3.22 Venting of Pressure Relief Devices
4.1 Cable Insulation Damage
4.2 Connector Mismating
4.3 Electrical Arcing
4.5 Electrical Cable Shorts
4.6 Electrical Connector Checks
4.7 Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
4.9 Power Distribution Paths Redundancy
4.12 Protective Cov;°rs for Electrical Equipment
4.13 Redundant C :cuits
5.3 Docking Closure Rate Control
• 5.6 Equipment Operatiun During EVA
5.7 Exterior Equipment Design and Location
5.8 Injury or Damage from Spacecraft Equipment
5.9 Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
5.12 Rotating Machinery Shielding
	
6.1	 Electrical Ignition
	
6.2	 Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment
	
6.3	 Flammable/Explosive Material Exterior to Spacecraft
	
6.4	 Hazardous Mixtures
	
6.5	 Pressure Subsystem Interconnection
	
6.6	 Pressure System Dynamics
	
6.7	 Pressure Systems Location
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6.8	 Pressure System Safing
6.9	 Pressure Tank Relief Protection Redundancy
6.10	 Propellant Tank Protection
7.4	 Bodily Injuries: Cuts, Contusions, Fractures, Sprains, etc.
7.5	 Burns, Chemical and Thermal
7.13	 Hazardous Materials Accessibility
9.8	 Orbital Path Radiation Environment
9.9
	
Placement of Equipment and Stores
9.12	 Radiation Effects upon Spacecraft Materials
9.21
	 Selection of Materials for Use in Radiation Environment
10.4	 Cryogenics
10.7	 Fire Control
10.8	 Fire Resistant Electrical Insulation
10.9	 Fire Retardant Electrical Equipment
10.10 Freezing of Fluid Lines
10.12 Heat Monitoring in Operating Equipment
10.13 Hypergolic and Pyrophoric Material
10.17 Lubricants
10.19 Over-current Protection
10.20 Personnel Protection for Heated Surfaces
10.21 Propellant Supply System Location
10.23 Self-Propagation of Fires
10.28 Thruster Location
10.29 Thruster Operation During EVA
10.30 Thruster Temperature Monitor
11.1 Angular Rate Monitor
11.2 Automatic Tumbling Correction
11.3 Component Redundancy
11.4 Component Replacement for CIA's
11.6 Damage-Induced I.dotion
11.7 Manual/Automatic Control Interlocks
11.8 Manual. Control of SCS Thrusters
11 10 Propellant Flow Shut-off Redundancy
11.11 Torques from Venting
11.12 Propellant Storage Tanks Redundancy
12.7 Attitude Indication Redundancy
12.13 Com par tmentation
12.15 Computer Equipment Redundancy
12.16 Continuous Attitude Indication
12.33 Fire Alarm
12.31 Fluid Quantity Usage Monitor
12.40 Inoperative Sensing Systems
12.43 Lighting
12.45 Maintenance Capability
12.46 Minimizing EVA Requirements
8
0
0
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12.50
12.52
12.53
12.55
12.56
12.57
12.59
Premature Subsystem Arming or Delayed Disarming
Propellant Leak Detection
Propellant Quantity and Usage
Replacement Component Installation
Replacement Component Provisioning
SCS Component Commonality
Switch Design and Location
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3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.10
3.11
3.14
3.17
3.18
3.19
3.23C
NXEDWGiPAGE BLANK NOT FILMED.
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^p	 4.2.8	 STRUCTURES/MECHANICAL SYSTEMS (S/M)
	
1.5
	
Control Procedures for Excessive Contamination
	
1.18
	
Materials- -Configuration Control
	
1.19
	
Mercury Metal
	
2.1	 Component Design for Meteoroid Impact Protection
	
2.3
	
Insulating Material
	
2.4
	
Window Replacement
Compartment Integrity
Crack Propagation in Primary Structure
Equipment Design. for Rapid Deccmpression
Hatch Automatic Closure
Hatch Closure
Hatch Positive Closure
Hatch Pressure Loading
Hatch Seal Leakage Rate
Hatchway Airlocks
Leakage Repair System
Medical Equipment for Emergencies
Pressure System Depressurization
Primary Structure Inspection and Repair
Rapid Decompression Effects
Spacecraft Structural Strength
Venting Provisions
C?
	4.1
	 Cable Insulation Damage
	
4.5	 Electrical Cable Shorts
	
4.7	 Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
	
4.8	 Potential Difference- -Docking Spacecraft
	
4.9	 Power Distribution Paths Redundancy
	
5.2	 Crew Restrictions During Docking
	
5 . 3	 Docking Closure Rate Control
	
5.4	 Docking Light Redundancy
	
5.5
	
Docking Port Redundancy
	
5.6	 Equipment Operation During EVA
	
5.7	 Exterior Equipment Design and Location
	
5.8 	 Injury or Damage from Spacecraft Equipment
	
5.10	 Mobility Aids, Zero Gravity
	
6.2	 Explosion -proof Electrical Equipment
	
6.3	 Flammable/Explosive Material Exterior to Spacecraft
	
6.4	 Hazardous Mixtures
	
6.5	 Pressure Subsystem Interconnection
	
6.6	 Pressure System Dynamics
	
6.8	 Pressure System Safing
	
6.11	 Protection of Pressure Vessels
	
6.12	 Shrouding and Shielding of Pressure Lines
- 367 -
D2-113070-5
0
7.1	 Angular Velocity Upper Limit
7.2	 Artificial Gravity Limits
7.4	 Bodily Injuries: Cuts, Contusions, kractures, Sprains, etc.
7.5	 Burns, Chemical and Thermal
7.6	 Communicable Disease Control
7.7	 Compartment Orientation within Artificial-Gravity Environment
7.9	 Death of Crew Members
7.13	 Hazardous Materials Accessibility
7.16	 Medical Emergencies
7.19	 Radial Traffic in Artificial-Gravity Environment
7.21	 Rotation Radius Lower Limit
7.22	 Sanitation Standards
8.2	 Airlock Oxygen Monitor
8.17	 Pressure Leak Detectors
8.18	 Pressure Relief Valve Repair Procedures
9.3	 Handling and Use of Radioactive Material
9.5	 Nuclear Power Radiation Protection
9.9
	
Placement of Equipment and Stores
9.10	 Protection Against Nuclear Explosion Radiation
9.12	 Radiation Effects upon Spacecraft Materials
9.16	 Radiation Haven
9.18	 Radiation Protection During EVA
9.20	 Spacecraft Radiation Shielding
9.21	 Selection of Materials for Use in Radiation Environment
10.3	 Containment of Fire
10.4	 Cryogenics
10.7	 Fire Control
10.9	 Fire Retardant Electrical Equipment
10.10 Freezing of Fluid Lines
10.12 Heat Monitoring in Operating Equipment
10.14 Isolation of Oxygen Source
10.16 Location of Combustibles
10.17 Lubricants
10.20 Personnel Protection for Heated Surfaces	 .
10.23 Self-Propagating Fires
10.25 Spacecraft Thermal. Protection
11.6	 Damage-Induced Motion
11.11 Zbrques from Venting
12.1	 Accessways
12.2	 Airlock Hatch Operation
12.3	 Airlock Pressurization Redundancy
12.4	 Airlock Redundancy
12.6	 Assistance to Injured Personnel
12.9	 Cargo Transfer Equipment Redundancy
12.13 Compaxtmentation
- 
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12.15
12.23
12.30
12.33
12.40f
12.43
12.45
12.46
12.50
s	 12.51
12.55
12.56
12.59
12.62
Computer Equipment Redundancy
Docking Mechanism Redundancy
Escape Routes
Fire Alarm
Inoperative Sensing Systems
Lighting
Maintenance Capability
Minimizing EVA Requirements
Premature Subsystem Arming or Delayed Disarming
Pressurized Free Volume
Replacement Component Installation
Replacement Component Provisioning
Switch Design and Location
Traffic Routes
0
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4.3	 CROSS INDEX BY KEY WORDS
Key words constitute one of the principal data retrieval methods. According-
ly, certain words common to space system terminology were selected, under
which the several guidelines have been identified. In making their selection,
the hazard groups and subsystem designations were generally avoided since
those terms are also used in this document as inde.—Ing categories. In some
cases a key word that identifies a guideline does not necessarily appear in
the guideline title or text, but is considered to be appropriate in convey-
ing the necessary thought. Guidelines have been identified by number only,
under the following key words:
access	 leakage
alarm system	 maintenance
atmosphere
	 materials
compartments	 medical
contamination	 monitoring
control	 nuclear power
cracks	 orbital parameters
crew	 oxygen
detection
	 pressure wall
equipment	 procedures
escape	 restraint
EVA	 seals
fluids	 storage
hatch	 traffic flow
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KEY WORD GUIDELME MMER
Access 39 5, 6, 7, 9, 14, 17, 20
4. 12
5• 72 9, 10
7. 4 2 8 1 13, 22
8. 25
9. 1, 9
10. 1, 3, 6, 7, 16, 19, 26
11. 3, 4
12. 1, 2, 3, 4 1 6, 13 2 14, 18, 19, 61, 62
Air See "Atmosphere"
Alarm System 1. 1, 6, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29
3. 6, 14, 24, 25
7. 5, 16
8. 1 1 2, 12, 17, 20, 21, 23, 29, 30
9• 1, 172 19
10. 12, 19, 271 30
11. 1, 2
12. 7, 10, 14, 22, 33, 34, 40, 47, 52, 53
Atmosphere 1. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 15, 20, 24, 27
2. 1
3• 1, 3, 5 1 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24
6. 1, 2, 4
8. 1, 3, 5, 8 1 9 1
 
l0, ll, 12, 132 14, 15Y 16, 17,
l9, 3D,
10. 15
11. 6l it
12. 14
Cabin See "Compartment"
Cabin Pressure See "Atmosphere"
Compartment 1. 5
2. 4
3. 11 2 , 4, 5 1 6, 7, 9, 18
5. 2
7. 6 2 7, 11, 22
8. 5, 9
9. 16, 20
10. 3, 6, 7, 14, 16
11. 6
12. 1, 36 4, 6, 13, 14, 18, 20, 22, 29, 30, 44, 51, 
Component See "Equipment"
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Contamination 1. All numbers 1 through 32
3. 5, 16, 21, 22, 254. 9
17. 8,3, 6,	 lo p 16,228. 1 1 10, 20, 31, 32 , 339. 2, 12, 19	 -10. 1, 3 1 4 1 8, 13, 14, 21, 23, 2412. 33
Control 1. 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 171 18 2 283. 12
5. 36. 97. 148. 5, 13, 15, i8 , 21, 23, 2710. 13, 14 0 18, 19, 22, 24 2 26, 270 280 29, 3011. 1, 2, 6 2 Ti 8, 10, 11
12. 4, 8, 10, 15, 16, 40, 59
Cracks 2. 43. 1, 2, 10, 17, 19
Crew 1. 9 1 12, 14 2 23, 293. 185. 2, 6, 8 1 11
7• 11 2 , 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 0 14, 15, 16,17, 238. 6
9. 6, 15
11. 5, 912. 11, 17, 18, 19, 21 2 28, 54, 58, 61
Detection 1. 41 61 24, 25, 263. 6 0 24, 25
5. 3
7• 38. 1, 2, 12, 17, 23, 30, 319• 11, 17, 19
10. 12, 27
11. 112. 7, 14 0 16 0
 22, 332 34, 40, 41, 47, 52, 53
Device	 See "Equipment"
Equipment	 19 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, u, 12 , 13, 14, 18, 19,
20, 21 0 22 0 232 25, 28, 30
2. 1, 3
-3?4-
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KEY WORD GUIDELINE NUMM
Equipment (cont.) 3• 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 1.1, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22
4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 , 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14
5. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, lo, u, 12
6. 2, 6
' 7. 17 9 23
8. 3, 7, 10, 26, 28, 31, 32, 33
9• 4, 9, 11
10. 1, 5, 9, 11, 12, 17, 18 9 19, 20, 22, 24, 26,
27, 28
ll. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, lo, 11
12. 9, 12, 15, 23, 24
	
27, 32, 38, 42, 43, 44, 49,
502 552 56, 57, 56, 59, 60
Escape 3. 42 5, 9
7. 20
8. 7
9. 10
10. 2, 7, 16
u- 5, 9
12 9 1, 2, 6 1 18, 25, 29, 30, 58
EVA 3, 10, ll, 17, 20
5. 6, 8, u
8. 3 2 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
9. 5, 13, 18
1o. 6, 26, 28, 29
u. 3, 4
l2. 2, 3, 4, 8, 17, 26, 27, 31, 46, 48
Fluids 1. 2 1 8, 9, lo, 11, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26
3. 1.2, 13, 15, 16, 18, 21
6. 3, 6, 7, 12
8. 6, 11
10. 10
ll. 6, l0, 12
12. 9, 34, 53
Gases See "Fluids"
Hatch	 3. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
4. 8
5•	 4, 5
8. 2, 3
12. 1, 2, 6, 14, 23, 30, 62
Indication	 See "Detection"
^s
	
Inspection	 See "Detection"
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Leakage 1. 2, 5 2 8 1 9 1 10, 21, 22, 23
3. 1 2 2, 7 1 8 1 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 25
6. 3, 4 1 6 1 7, 8, lo, 11, 12
8. 2 2 3, 11, 12, 17, 30
10. 10, 15, 21
11. 6, 11
12. 342 52, 53
.
Liquids See "Fluids"
Maintenance 1. 3, 9 1 18, 21, 22, 23, 25
2. 1, 4
3. 8, lo, 14, 17, 20
4. 1 1 2, 3, 5 1 6, 7, 12 2 13, 14
5• 11
6. 2 1 8, to
7. 4 1 8 1 22, 23
8. 11, 18, 25
lo. 1, 6
11. 3, 4,
12. 8 1 lo, 21, 45, 46, 55, 56, 57
Materials 1. 1 1	 18	 1	 2	 26	 285,	 ,	 9^	 3,
2. 4
3. 10
4. 1
6. 3
7. 13, 17
9. 3, 12, 21
10. 9, 13, 23
Medical 1. 16
3. 11
7• 1 1 2 , 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
.
9. 14, 15, 16, 20
Monitoring 1. 1 1 4 1 61 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29
3. 24, 25
4. to
5• 3
7• 3
8. 2, 17 2 20, 21, 23, 29
9• 5, 15, 17
10. 12, 27
11. 1
12. 4, 7, 8, 10, 14, 16, 22, 34, 35 2 40, 41, 47 2 48
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KEY WORD GUIDELINE NUMBER
Nuclear Power J. 26
7. 8, 20
9• 2 , 3,	 5, 6, 7, 9, il l 12, 16, 18
10. 5 2 6 1 9 1 19
Orbital Parameters 2. 2
9. 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 20
10. 25
11. 1
.	 Oxygen 1. 5, 20
3. 11, 12
6. 13
7• 5
8. 2, 3,	 5,	 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 30
10. 15, 24
Personnel See "Crew"
Pressure Wall 2. 3
3. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8 1 9, 109 16, 17, 18, 19, 22 2 23
8. 2 1 17, 18
10. 25
Procedures 1. 5 2 6 1 18, 21, 23, 26
3. 10, 11, 17, 20
4. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7
5. 1 1 2, 3, 6
6. 5
7• 4, 5, 6 , 7, 8 , 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 212
22, 23
8. 18, 19, 24, 31
9. 2, 4 1
 10
10. 2 1 14, 16, 20 2 27, 29, 30
- 11. 2, 3, 9
12. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 1 8, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19 2 20,
21, 24, 25, 28, 29 2 301 311 35 1 36, 37, 39, 43,
. 45, 46, 47, 48 , 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 63
Regulate See "Control"
Repair See "Maintenance"
Replace See "Maintenance"
Restraint 5. 1, 10, 12
7• 15, 23
11. 2, 5, 9
12. 23
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KEY WORD GUIDELINE NUNM
Seals	 1. 12
2. 3, 4
3• 3, 5, 8, 9) 10, 17
4. 8
5. 11
6. 1, 2, 6
8. 2, 17
lo. 1
Storage
	 1. 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 26, 30, 31, 32
5. 1
6. lo, 11
7• 9, 10, 13, 22
8. 8, 11, 14, 33
9• 3, 19
10. 2, 13, 15, i62 21, 23
11. 12
12. 9, 34, 52
Traffic Flow	 5. 2, 10
7• 2 1 4, 7) 19, 21, 23
9• 5, 6
10. 2, 16
11. 5, 9
12. 1, 3 1 4 1 14, 17, 18, 19, 3o, 61 62
n
Y
0
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CROSS INDEX BY DAMAGE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL
The following list of guidelines are those which are pertinent to the
detection, containment and control of damage. It should be noted, however,
that the study was oriented toward crew safety. Its emphasis was, there-
fore, on preventing or reducing the probability of occurrence of any
event which would impose a hazard on the crew, rather than on the remedial
action to be taken after the event occurred.
1.5
1.9
1.10
1.15
1.24
1.26
2.3
3.1
3.2
3.4
3.5
3.8
3.9
3.10
3.17
3.24
6.2
6.10
8.17
10.3
10.7
12.1
12.5
12.6
12.8
12.10
12.13
12.14
12.20
12.22
12.24
12.28
12.33
12.42
12.43
12.62
Control Procedures for Excessive Contamination
Fluid/Debris Collection and/or Containment
Fluid Leak Isolation
Hazardous Materials - Quantities
Warning System - Contaminants Detection and Alarm
Warning System - Hazardous Materials
Insulating Material
Compartment integrity
Crack Propagation in Primary Structure
Hatch Automatic Closure
Hatch Closure
Hatch Seal Leakage Rate.
Hatchway Airlocks
Leakage Repair System
Primary Structure Inspection and Repair
Warning Systems, Cabin Pressure
Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment
Propellant Tank Protection
Pressure Leak Detectors
Containment of Fire
Fire Control
Accessways
Alternate Command and Control Center
Assistance of Injured Personnel
Authority to Proceed with HazardouE and Certain
Closed Circuit Television Monitoring
Compartmentation
Compartment Environmental Status
Crew-oriented Areas
Critical Caution and Warning Alarms
Emergency Communications System
Emergency Procedures and Training
Fire Alarm
Intercom System
Lighting
Traffic Routes
Other Operations
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5.o REFERENCES
The following references are the master list of the principal sources of
information used in the Space Station Safety Study. It includes all
references which are cited in the study report documents and also references
which, although not specifically cited, were used as background or supporting
material. Individual report documents each contain a list of references
appropriate to that document, this list being an extract f: •om, and with
the same reference numbers as, the master list.
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No. Title Report No. Source Date ontract No Cl.
1 AAP Crew Operations--Crew Safety Analysis, ED-2002 -24, Martin 2/10/67 NAS8-21004 U
Cluster Mission AAP Flight #2, Vehicle AS Revision A
209 (Including experiment hazards)
2 AAP Payload Integration--Contingency Analy- ED-2002-387, Martin 4/8/68 NAS8-24000 U
sis, Crew Procedures, Fire and Loss of Pres Part II
sure
3 AAP Payload Integration--Orbital Workshop ED-2002-284, Martin 7/31/68 NAS8-2+000 U
Crew Hazard Analysis Revision C
4 AAP Payload Integration--Radiation Analysis ED-2002-42 Martin 3/15/67 NAS8-21004 U
for the Apollo Applications Program
5 AAP Payload Integration--RF Radiation Expo- ED-2002-442 Martin /15/68 58-24000 U
sure During EVA Film Recovery
6 Analysis of the Required Operational Charac- SAMSO-TR-67-7, North American 1/67 it Force C
teristics of Space Escape Systems--Emergent Volume III Rockwell 04695-67-
Situation Analysis and Escape System Charac- -0111
teristics
7 Analytical Methods for Space Vehicle Atmos- ASD-TR-61-162, C.S. Coe, et al-- 1/62 -- U
pheric Control Processes Part II Aerospace Systems
Division, Air Forc
Systems Command,
Wright-Patterson
AFB, Ohio
8 Apollo Logistics Support System (ALSS) Pay- D2-83212-1 Boeing 6/65 AS8-11411 U
loads--MOLAB Reliability and Crew Safety
9 Apollo Operations Handboo':., Command and SM2A-03-s=4 NASA/MSC /20/69 S9-15C U
Service Modules--Operationai Procedures (2), Volume 2
(Apollo 9, CSM 104)
No. Title Report No. Source Date ontract No Cl.
10 Apollo Spacecraft Integrated System Safety 1)2-118112-3 Boeing 1/14/69 NASw-1650 U
Assessment CSM-104/LM-3, Mission "D" (Volumes I
and II),
D2-113112-3A
(Volume I,
Revision A)
11 Atmospheric Contaminants in Spacecraft --- Report of the Pan 0/68 --- U
on Air Standards
for Manned Space
Flight, of the
Space Science
Board, National
Academy of Science
12 Bioastronautics --- K.E. Schaefer (ed. 964 --- U
The McMillan Co.,
New York
13 Bioastronautics Data Book NASA SP-3006 NASA/Headquarters 964 -- U
14 Candidate Experiment Program for Manned --- NASA/Headquarters 5/69 --- U
Space Stations
15 Chemistry of Industrial Toxicology, The --- H.B. Elkins--Wiley, 950 --- U
New York
16 Concept for Space Flight Safety, A --- R.B. Richards-- /67 --- u
Paper presented at
the 4th Space Con-
gress, Canaveral
Council of Techni-
cal Societies,
Cocoa Beach
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No. Title Report No. Source Date ontract No Cl.
1't Contamination Pattern in the Enclosed Atmos Technical R.A. Saunders-- 4/63 --- U
phere of Mercury Spacecraft Report Aeronautical Sys-
No. 63-260 tems Division,
Wright-Patterson
AFB, Ohio
18 Contingency Planning for Space-Flight Emer- Memorandum S.H. Dole, et al-- 1/67 NASr-21(13) U
gencies RM-5200-NASA Rand Corp., Santa
Monica
19 Design Criteria, Technical Coordination D2-113532 -12 Boeing --- NAS9-6816, U
Document Appendix II NAs9-6796
20 Design/Maintainability Trades D2-113551-1 Boeing 4/67 --- U
21 Detoxication Mechanisms --- R.T. Williams-- 1959 --- U
John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., New York
22 Early Orbital Space Station (FOSS), Techni- DAC-56550 McDonnell-Douglas /67 --- U
cal Report
23 Effects of High Altitude, The (Handbook of --- U.C. Luft--Ameri- 969 --- U
Respiration Physiology, Volume 2 can Physiological
Society, Wash. D.0
24 Effluents of Men and Their Significance in --- T.B. Weber--Hero- 963 -- U
Bioastronautics, The space Medicine
Publications
25 Emergency Earth Orbital Escape Device Study LMSC A940555, Lockheed /31/69 -- U
Volume 2B
26 Factors Affecting the Interior Design of MSC Internal NASA/MSC /15/67 --- U
Crew Compartments for Long-Duration Space Note #68-ET-
Flight
N00
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No. Title Report Po. Source Date tract No Cl.
27 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the LED 550-160, Grumman 1/69 NAS9-1100 U
LK-4 Vehicle (Mission Oriented) Volume I
28 Familiarization and Operations Manual-- 8812700149A International 11/68 --- U
Model A7L, Apollo Block II, Contract End Latex Corp.
Items
29 First-Order Logic --- Raymond M. Smul]yan 1968 --- U
--Springer-Verlag
New York, Inc.
30 Flammability During Weightlessness NASA Technical NASA/MSC 5/66 --- U
Memorandum
TN-X-58001
31 Flammability in Zero-Gravity Environment NASA Technic NASA/MSC 10/66 --- U
Report
M-R-246
32 Gravity Effects on Combustion MSC Internal NASA/MSC 0/20/67 --- U
Note
MSC-ES-R-67-1
33 Handbook of Poisoning Diagnosis and Treat- --- R.H. Dreishbach-- 1959 -- U
went Lange Medical Pub-
lications, Los
Altos, California
34 Now Big is the Space Flight Maintenance --- R.B. Carpenter, Jr 3/66 -- U
Problem! Presentation at
Space Maintenance
& EVA Conference
Orlando, Florida
35 Human Factors/Life Sc^:;aces Design Applica- --- Martin Marietta 9/67 -- U
ties Handbook
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No. Title Report No. Source Date ontract No Cl.
36 Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology, N. II --- Frank A. Patty ( 1962 --- U
Interscience Pub-
lishers, New York
37 Influence of Strong Magnetic Fields on the 35:	 939-949 D.E. Beischer, J.C. 1964 --- U
Electrocardiogram of Squirrel Monkeys Knepton--Aerospace
Medicine
38 Intermediate Workshop Study, Modular MSC-EA-R-68 -1, NASA/MSC 10/68 --- U
Approach Volume 1
39 Introduction to Symbolic Logic --- A.H. Basson, D.J. 1960 --- U
O'Connor--The Free
Press of Glencoe,
Illinois
40 Investigation of Toxic Properties of Ma.teri- AMRL-TDR-63 -9„ W.J. Olewinski, G. 12/63 --- U
als Used in Space Vehicles Rapier, K. Slaveki
H. Warner--Biomedi
cal Laboratory,
657th Aerospace
Medical Research
Laboratories, USAF
Wright-Patterson
AFB, Ohio
41 Life Support Systems for :apace Flights of NASA CR-614 General Dynamics 11/66 S1-2934 U
Extended Time Periods
42 Maintainability of Manned Spacecraft for D2-113204-1, Boeing 7/67 S2-3705 U
Long-Duration Flights--Summary Report Volume I
43 Maintainability of Manned Spacecraft for D2-113204-2, Boeing 7/67 S2- 3705 U
Long-Duration Flights--Technical Report Volume II
44 Maintainability of Manned Spacecraft for D2-113204-3, Boeing 7/67 2-3705 U
Long-Duration Flights--Work Data Volume III
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45 Mduuzed Interplanetary Travel --- R. Carpenter-- 6/66 --- U
Mechanical Engi-
neering
46 Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MOLL) SM-46085 Douglas 9/64 NAS1-3612 U
Study--Environmental Control/Life Support
System
47 Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) SM-44615 Douglas 9/63 NAS1-2974 S
Study--Safety, Reliability and Maintain-
ability
48 Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) SM-46086 Douglas 9/64 NAS1-3612 U
Study--Stabilization and Control System
49 Alarmed Orbital Research Laboratory (MARL) SM-48817 Douglas 12/65 NASl-3612 U
Study--System Improvement Study--Stabiliza-
tion and Control
50 Manned Orbital Research Laboratory Non) SM-46075 Douglas 9/64 NA81-3612 U
Study--Systems Analysis; Flight Crew
51 Manned Spacecraft Criteria and Standards MSCM 8080 NASA/MSC 1/68 --- U
52 Manned Space Flight Program Risk Analysis ASD-MR-08-67- Apollo Support De- 8/67 --- U
7, Preliminary partment, General
Draft Electric Company,
Daytona	 Beach
53 Man ' s Dependence on the Earthly Atmosphere --- K.E. Schaefer (ed. 1962 --- U
The McMillan Co.,
New York
5k Mars Landing and Reconnaissance Mission En- SIB 414-2 Hamilton Standard --- --- U
vironmental Control and Life Support System
Study
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55 Mars Landing and Reconnaissance Mission En- SLS 414-3 Hamilton Standard 3/64 NAS9-1701 U
vironmental Control and Life Support System
Study
56 Mathematical Discovery. 	 (On understanding, --- George Polya, Jo 1965 --- U
learning, and teaching problem solving), Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Volumes I and II
57 Maximal. Acceptable Concentrations, A Com- 51:45-49 H.B. Elkins-- 1961 --- U
pariscn in Russia and the United States Archives of Envi-
ronmental Healu*-h
58 Meteoroid Environment--Near-Earth and Cis- DS-21, NASA/MSC 1/24/6 --- U
lunar Revision A
59 Meteoroid Protection for Spacecraft Struc- CR-54201 J.R. Lundeberg, 10/65 --- U
tures et al--NASA
60 Methods of Enhancing Crew Safety --- NASA/MSC 10/68 --- U
61 Modus Operandi of Threshold Limits Committe 25:	 589-594 H.E. Stokinger-- 1964 --- U
of ACGIH American Industr
Hygiene Associa-
tion J.
62 Needs and Requirements for a Manned Space NASA 11166 --- U
Station, '.'he--Research and Development in
Advanced Technology, Volume VII
63 Nuclear Power Submarine Atmosphere Control NAVSHIPS 0938 Department of the 12/67 --- U
(U)24 Olt-4010 Navy, Wash. D.C.
64 Operational Toxicology in the Navy 126:	 340-3461 L. Siegel--Milita 1961 --- U
Medicine
65 Operations and Logistics Study of a Manned LR 17366 Lockheed 12/63 NAS9-1422 C
Orbital Space Station
N00
No. Title Report No. Source Date 31ontract No Cl.
66 Physics and Engineering of Rapid Decompres- Project No. F. Haber, H.G. 8/53 --- U
sion 21-1201 -008, Clamann--USAF
Report No. 3 School of Aviation
Medicine, Randolp
Field, Texas
67 Poisoning --- W.F. VonOettingen 1958 --- U
W.B. Saunders Co.,
Philadelphia
68 Preliminary Technica ,	to for Earth Orbit- MSC-EA-R -66-1 NASA/MSC 11/7/6 --- U
ing Space Station--Standards and Criteria Volume II
69 Preliminary Technical Data for Earth Orbit- MSC-EA-R -66 -1, NASA/MSC (JAG) 11/66 --- U
ing Space Station--Systems Volume III
70 Principia Mathematics Volume I, 2nd Whitehead and 1963 --- U
Edition (1927) Russell,Cambridge
University Press
71 Radiation Control Program AFETRM 160-1 Air Force Systems 9/65 --- U
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ters Air Force
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72 Radiation Safety During Space Flights NASA 71T F 346 V.G. Bobkov--NASA 5/66 --- U
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John F. Kennedy
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75 Report on the Optimization of the Manned SM-46071 Douglas 9/64 NAS1 -3612 U
Orbital Research Laboratory NORL) System
Concept--Summary Report
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for Apollo Block II Missions
77 Risk of Bends During Apollo Operations at B69 -03028 Bellcom, Inc. 3/12/69 --- U
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78 Safety Requirements for Man-Rating Space --- NASA/Headquarters 11/8/68 --- U
Systems (Draft)
79 Saturn V Single Launch Space Station and D2-113537 -1 Boeing 11/67 NAS9-6816 U
Observatory Facility, Earth Orbital Mission
Requirements
80 Saturn V Single Launch Space Station and W-113538-1 Boeing 11/67 NAS9-6816 U
Observatory Facility, Earth Orbital Station
Utilization
81 Saturn V Single Launch Space Station and 2-113539-1 Boeing 11/67 NA89-6816 U
Observatory Facility, Earth Orbital Station
Design
82 Sensory Physiology as Basis for Air Quality 5:	 580-594 V.A. Ryazonov-- 1962 --- U
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mental Health
83 Space-Cabin Atmosphere, Part I--Oxygen SA SP-47 E.M. Roth--NASA/ 1964 --- U
Toxicity Headquarters
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85 Spacecraft Cabin Atmosphere Safety Hazard Alert No. NASA/Ames 613169 --- U
ARC -69-01
86 Spacecraft Damage Containment and Control --- E.L. McCabe; J.W. 10/9/69 --- U
Procedures Wild--Boeing; NASA
Presented to Space
Rescue Symposium,
International Acad-
emy of Astronautic
XXth International
Astronautical Fed-
eration Congress,
Mar del Plata,
Argentina
87 Space Design Data D2-11+000-1 Boeing 1169 --- U
68 Space Environment Criteria Guidelines for NASA TM X- NASA/MSFC 10/31/ --- U
Use in Space Vehicle Development 53798., 1968
Revision
89 Space Flight Emergencies and Space Flight 73-1780 Staff Study for th 1967 --- U
Safety---A Survey Subcommittee on
NASA Oversight, of
the Committee on
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tics, U.S. House of
Representatives,
90th Congress, U.S.
Government Printin
Office, Washington
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Safety Office
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91 Space Station Program Definition Study --- NASA/Headquarters 5/8/69 --- U
(Phase B)--Bidders' Conference
92 Space Station Program Definition Study 9-4-7895 NASA/Headquarters 4/14/69 --- U
(Phase B)--Statement of Mork
93 Space Station Safety Study--Statement of --- NASA/MSC 1968 NAS9-9046 U
Work
94 SST Cabin Pressure Altitude Control Capa- D6A-10783-1 Boeing 10/67 --- U
bility During Failure Conditions
95 SST Fault Tree Analysis D6A-10784-1 Boeing 3/68 --- U
96 Study for Basic Subsystem Module Preliminary GDC-DAB67-003 General Dynamics 10/67 NAS9-6796 U
Definition
97 Study of a Rotating Manned Orbital Space LR 17502, Lockheed 3/64 NAS9-1665 U
Station--Human Factors Volume 6
983 Study of Manned Space Flight Emergency Con- ATR-68(7O80)-2 Aerospace Corp. 4/68 NASW-1561 U
cepts- -Appendices Volume II
99 . Study of Radiation Hazards to Men on Extend- D2-114299-1 Boeing 3/25/69 NASw-1362 U
ed Missions (II)
100 Symbolic Logic (Third Edition) --- Irving Mr Copi-- 1967 --- U
The McMillan Co.
101 Symposium on Toxicity in the Closed Ecologi- AD 4409+2 M. Honna, H.J. 7/63 --- U
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103 System Safety Requirements for Aerospace D2 -1.1_3o69 -1 Boeing 4/8/69 --- U
Vehicles and Ground Equipment
104 System Safety Requirements for Manned Space NASA Safety NASA/Headquarters 1/69 --- U
Flight Program Direc-
tive No. 1
105 Textbook of Toxicology --- K.P. Dubois, E.M.X 1959 --- U
Geillag--Oxford
University Press,
New York
106 Toxicity of Industrial Metals --- E. Browning-- 1961 --- U
Butterworths,
London
107 Toxicologist's View of Threshold Limits, A 23:	 37-44 H.F. Smyth--AMA 1962 --- U
Journal
108 Trade-Off Study and Conceptual Designs of --- Hamilton-Standard 7/69 NAS1-7905 U
Regenerative Advanced Integrated Life Sup-
port Systems (AILSS)
109 Use of a Heuristic Timeline Program to --- Frank W. Burns-- 5/69 --- U
Derive Space Station Requirements American Astronau-
tical Society 14th
Annual Meeting,
Dedham, Mass.
110 U.S. Navy 1962 Submarine Atmosphere Habita- NAVSHIPS Bureau of Ships, 1962 --- U
bility Data Book No. 250-649-1, Department of the
Revision No. 1 Navy, Wash. D.C.
111 Voyager Faii„,re Modes and Effects Analysis D2-82724-2 Boeing 8/65 JPL 951111 U
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113 Webster's Third International Dictionary --- GO Merriam Co 1966 --- U
114 World of Mathematics, The (Volumes I, II an --- James R. Newman-- 1976 --- T,
III) Simon and Shuster
115 Earth Orbital Laboratory Environmental --- W.W. Guy--NASA/MSC 9/66 --- U
Control and Life Support System
116 Manned Environmental System Assessment_
(MESA)
--- Boeing 5/64 NASw-658 U
117 Closed Respiratory Environmental System D2-90254 Boeing 9/62 --- U
Test (CREST)
118 Compendium of Human Responses to the Aero- CR-1205, NASA 1968 --- U
space Environment, Volume I Volume I
119 Compendium of Human Responses to the Aero- CR-1205, NASA 1968 --- U
space Environment, Volume II Volume II
120 Compendium of Human Responses to the Aero- CR-1205, NASA 1968 --- U
space Environment, Volume III olume III
121 Medical Aspects of an Orbiting Research SP-86 NASA 1966 --- U
Laboratory
122 Safety Engineering of Systems and Associated MIL S-3813) DOD 3/67 --- U
Subsystems and Equipment, General Require-
ments
123 Hypervelocity Particle Penetration into D2-24149-1 G.T. Burch--Boeing 4/67 --- U
Manned Spacecraft Atmosphere
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